

2. Concepts of Jomini
3. Concepts of Clausewitz

#### **UNIT III ADVENT OF MODERN PERIOD.**

1. Schlieffen Plan.
2. Concept of Helmut Von Moltke.
3. Concept of Expanding Torrent.

#### **UNIT IV CONCEPTS ON LAND, AIR & NAVAL WARFARE.**

1. Mao's theory of Guerilla warfare
2. Douhet's theory of Air Power
3. Mahan's theory of Sea Power

#### **UNIT V NUCLEAR ERA.**

1. The Impact of Nuclear weapons on Strategy
2. Strategy of Deterrence
3. Nuclear Strategies since 1945

---

#### **Books Recommended for Reference:**

1. **Earle Mead** : Makers of Modern Strategy
2. **Parot Peter** : Makers of Modern Strategy
3. **Tripathi. KS.** : Evolution of Nuclear Strategy



## UNIT-V

### TOPIC-1

## NUCLEAR ERA

### IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON STRATEGY



A **strategic nuclear weapon** refers to a nuclear weapon that is designed to be used on targets often in settled territory far from the **battlefield** as part of a **strategic plan**, such as **military bases, military command centers, arms industries, transportation, economic, and energy infrastructure**, and heavily populated areas such as cities and towns, which often contain such targets. It is in contrast to a tactical nuclear weapon, which is designed for use in battle as part of an attack with and often near friendly conventional forces, possibly on contested friendly territory.

---

How have nuclear weapons changed world politics?

The **nuclear** powers gained the ability to use “threat of n-**weapons**” for securing their national interests in **international relations**. ... During 1945-90 the **nuclear weapons** influenced

the **politics** of cold war. These kept the securing of disarmament and arms control highly complex and problematic and un-successful exercise.

In some ways, nuclear weapons merely made effective the earlier promise of air power—overwhelming violence delivered at an opponent’s cities, bypassing its military forces. Nuclear weapons were different, however, in their speed, their destructiveness, and the apparent absence of countervailing measures. Furthermore, the expense and high technology of nuclear weapons suddenly created two classes of powers in the world: those who wielded these new tools of war and those who did not.

In the ensuing decades, nuclear facts and nuclear strategy had a peculiarly uneasy coexistence. Many of the realities of nuclear weapons—how many were in each arsenal, the precise means for their delivery, the reliability of the devices themselves and of the planes, missiles, and crews that had to deliver them—were obscure. So too were the plans for their use, although a combination of declassification of early U.S. war plans and the flood of information that came out of the Warsaw Pact countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 illuminated some of the darkness.


After the **US** dropped **atomic bombs** on two major cities in Japan, Japan surrendered. After the **US** dropped **atomic bombs** on two major cities in Germany, Germany surrendered.

The United States detonated two **atomic bombs** over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, killing 210,000 people—children, women, and men. President Truman authorized the use of the **atom bombs** in an effort to bring about Japan's surrender in the **Second World War**.

## UNIT-V

### TOPIC-2

## STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE



### தடுப்பு -Deterrence

Deterrence theory is the idea that an inferior force, by virtue of the destructive power of the force's weapons, could deter a more powerful adversary if the force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack.

**Deterrence**, military strategy under which one power uses the threat of reprisal effectively to preclude an attack from an adversary power. With the advent of **nuclear weapons**, the term deterrence largely has been applied to the basic strategy of the nuclear powers and of the major alliance systems. The premise of the strategy is that each **nuclear power** maintains a high level of instant and overwhelming destructive capability against any aggression—i.e., the ability, visible and credible to a would-be attacker, to inflict unacceptable damage upon the attacker with forces that survive a surprise attack. An essential element in successful deterrence is a degree of uncertainty on the part of a would-be aggressor as to whether the target power, although attacked and badly damaged, will nonetheless retaliate—even at the risk of suffering further, crippling

damage in a second attack. Thus, nuclear-deterrence strategy relies on two basic conditions: the ability to retaliate after a surprise attack must be perceived as credible; and the will to retaliate must be perceived as a possibility, though not necessarily as a certainty.

The use of military threats as a means to deter international crises and war has been a central topic of **international security** research for at least 200 years. Research has focused predominantly on the theory of rational deterrence to analyze the conditions under which conventional deterrence is likely to succeed or fail. Alternative theories, however, have challenged the rational deterrence theory and have focused on organizational theory and **cognitive psychology**.

## UNIT-V

### TOPIC-3

## NUCLEAR STRATEGIES SINCE-1945



125,000 nuclear warheads

The authors calculate that some 125,000 **nuclear warheads have been built since 1945**, about 97 percent **of** them by the United States and the Soviet Union and Russia

---

The use of atomic **weapons changed the nature of war**, altered the balance of power and began the **nuclear** age. The dropping of the atomic **bombs** in Japan is considered the beginning of the **nuclear** age. The use of these **bombs** introduced a new type of **weapon** capable of mass destruction.

---

It thrust the world into the atomic age, **changing warfare** and geopolitical relations forever. Less than a month later, the U.S. dropped two **nuclear weapons** on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan—further proving it was now possible to obliterate large swaths of land and kill masses of people in seconds

**Nuclear strategy** involves the development of **doctrines and strategies** for the production and use of **nuclear weapons**.

As a sub-branch of **military strategy**, nuclear strategy attempts to match nuclear weapons as means to political ends. In addition to the actual use of nuclear weapons whether **in the battlefield or strategically**, a large part of nuclear strategy involves their use as a bargaining tool.

Some of the issues considered within nuclear strategy include:

- Under what conditions does it serve a nation's interest to develop nuclear weapons?
- What types of nuclear weapons should be developed?
- When and how should such weapons be used?

Many strategists argue that nuclear strategy differs from other forms of **military strategy**. The immense and terrifying power of the weapons makes their use, in seeking victory in a traditional military sense, impossible.

Perhaps counterintuitively, an important focus of nuclear strategy has been determining how to prevent and deter their use, a crucial part of **mutual assured destruction**.

In the context of **nuclear proliferation** and maintaining the **balance of power**, states also seek to prevent other states from acquiring nuclear weapons as part of nuclear strategy. In the late 1940s and 1950s as the **Cold War** developed, the United States and Soviet Union pursued multiple delivery methods and platforms to deliver nuclear weapons. Three types of platforms proved most successful and are collectively called a "**nuclear triad**". These are air-delivered weapons (**bombs or missiles**), ballistic missile submarines (usually nuclear-powered and called **SSBNs**), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (**ICBMs**), usually deployed in land-based hardened missile silos or on vehicles.

Although not considered part of the deterrent forces, all of the nuclear powers deployed large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in the Cold War. These could be delivered by virtually all platforms capable of delivering large conventional weapons.

During the **1970s** there was growing concern that the combined conventional forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact could overwhelm the forces of **NATO**. It seemed unthinkable to respond to a Soviet/Warsaw Pact incursion into Western Europe with strategic nuclear weapons, inviting a catastrophic exchange.

