

2. Concepts of Jomini
3. Concepts of Clausewitz

UNIT III ADVENT OF MODERN PERIOD.

1. Schlieffen Plan.
2. Concept of Helmut Von Moltke.
3. Concept of Expanding Torrent.

UNIT IV CONCEPTS ON LAND, AIR & NAVAL WARFARE.

1. Mao's theory of Guerilla warfare
2. Douhet's theory of Air Power
3. Mahan's theory of Sea Power

UNIT V NUCLEAR ERA.

1. The Impact of Nuclear weapons on Strategy
2. Strategy of Deterrence
3. Nuclear Strategies since 1945

Books Recommended for Reference:

1. **Earle Mead** : Makers of Modern Strategy
2. **Parot Peter** : Makers of Modern Strategy
3. **Tripathi. KS.** : Evolution of Nuclear Strategy



UNIT-IV

TOPIC-1

MAO'S THEORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

Mao states that guerrilla warfare is “a powerful special weapon with which we resist the Japanese and without which we cannot defeat them.” Mao explains how **guerrilla warfare** can only succeed if employed by revolutionaries because it is a political and military style.

According to Mao, guerrilla warfare is a way for the Chinese to expel an intruder that has more arms, equipment, and troops.

The Relation of Guerrilla Hostilities to Regular Operations

Mao explains the differences and the relationship between guerrilla and regular troops. Guerrilla warfare needs to be decentralized to allow quickness and detachment. However, orthodox troops can temporarily adopt guerrilla strategy and vice versa.

Guerrilla Warfare in History

Mao refers to a bevy of wars from different continents to support his belief that guerrilla warfare is necessary to expel more powerful potential conquerors. He refers specifically to Russian resistance during the **French invasion of Russia** and the Abyssinians' failures to resist Italian aggression in the **Second Italo-Abyssinian War**. He also makes reference to the use of guerrilla tactics in the Sanyuanli incident during the **First Opium War**, the **Taiping Rebellion** and the **Boxer Uprising**. He also states that guerrilla warfare cannot succeed on its own without orthodox warfare. The two should work together in an effort to defeat a larger, stronger enemy.

Mao explains that Japan's military efforts do not have complete citizen and soldier support. He believes that China can defeat the enemy if they use guerrilla warfare and extend the duration of the war.

Organization for Guerrilla Warfare

Mao says that guerrilla bands can be created from the masses or soldiers. Guerrilla units should learn to be independent of higher leadership because they may need to function without it. Guerrilla troops should acquire supplies, ammunition, and weapons from the Japanese after victories on the battle field.

The Political Problems of Guerrilla Warfare

Mao explains the inalienable political aspects of guerrilla warfare and any warfare in general. "Military action is a method used to attain a political goal. While military action and political affairs are not identical, it is impossible to isolate one from the other." Chinese guerrilla soldiers must be self-disciplined and committed to the revolutionary cause .

The Strategy of Guerrilla Resistance against Japan

Mao explains that guerrilla troops should have no conception of defense or battle lines. They should attack orthodox Japanese troops from the front, the sides, and the rear. Guerrilla troops should always dictate the timing of conflicts with the enemy.


UNIT-IV

TOPI-2

2.DOUHET THEORY OF AIR POWER

General Guilio Douhet

- Early advocate of Air Power use
- His book “Command of the Air” in 1921
 - Air Power should act independently
 - Strengthen all possible resources
 - Conquest the command of air
 - No diversion of enemy resources
 - Organized Civil aviation
 - Only offense no defensive attitude
 - Quick mobility
- Air alone could win the war.



In his book Douhet argued that air power was revolutionary because it operated in the third dimension. Aircraft could fly over surface forces, relegating them to secondary importance. The vastness of the sky made defense almost impossible, so the essence of air power was the offensive. The only defense was a good offense.

The air force that could achieve command of the air by bombing the enemy air arm into extinction would doom its enemy to perpetual bombardment. Command of the air meant victory.

Douhet believed in the **morale** effects of bombing. Air power could break a people's will by destroying a country's "vital centers". Armies became superfluous because aircraft could overfly them and attack these centers of the government, military and industry with impunity, a principle later called "**The bomber will always get through**".

Douhet identified the five basic target types as: industry, transport infrastructure, communications, government and "the will of the people".

The last category was particularly important to Douhet, who believed in the principle of **total war**.

This emphasis on the strategic offensive would blind Douhet to the possibilities of air defense or tactical support of armies. In his second edition of *The Command of the Air* he maintained such aviation was "useless, superfluous and harmful".

The entire population was in the front line of an air war and they could be terrorized with urban bombing. In his book *The War of 19--* he described a fictional war between Germany and a Franco-Belgian alliance in which the Germans launched massive terror bombing raids on the populace, reducing their cities to ashes before their armies could mobilize. Because bombing would be so terrible,

In other words, the enemy air force was the primary target. A decisive victory here would hasten the end of the war.

However, subsequent conflicts would largely discredit Douhet's theory. **Air Marshal Arthur "Bomber" Harris** set out in 1942 to prove Douhet's theories valid during **World War II**. Through four years under his command, **RAF Bomber Command** attempted to destroy the main German cities. By 1944–1945, in partial concert with the **USAAF**, they had largely achieved this aim; but no revolution toppled the **Third Reich**. The heavy bombers involved in the **Combined Bomber Offensive** did not win the war alone, as Harris had argued they would. Douhet's theories about forcing the population to start a revolution, when subjected to practical application, were shown to be ineffective.


Though the initial response to *The Command of the Air* was muted, the second edition generated virulent attacks from his military peers, particularly those in the navy and army.

But his theories would be unproven and therefore unchallenged for another 20 years. In many cases, he had hugely exaggerated the effects of bombing. His calculations for the amount of bombs and poison gas required to destroy a city were ludicrously optimistic. **World War II** would prove many of his predictions to be wrong, particularly on the vulnerability of public morale to bombing.

UNIT-IV

TOPIC-3

MAHAN'S THEORY OF SEA POWER



Mahan argued that British control of the **seas**, combined with a corresponding decline in the naval strength of its major European rivals, paved the way for Great Britain's emergence as the world's dominant military, political, and economic **power**.

Mahan believed that national greatness was inextricably associated with the sea, with its commercial use in peace and its control in war; and he used history as a

stock of examples to exemplify his **theories**, arguing that the education of naval officers should be based on a rigorous study of history.

Mahan, a naval strategist and the author of *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, argued that national prosperity and power depended on control of the world's sea-lanes. "Whoever rules the waves rules the world," **Mahan** wrote. **Sea power**, means by which a nation extends its military **power** onto the **seas**. Measured in terms of a nation's capacity to use the **seas** in defiance of rivals and competitors, it consists of such diverse elements as combat craft and weapons, auxiliary craft, commercial shipping, bases, and trained personnel.

Sea power, means by which a nation extends its military power onto the seas. Measured in terms of a nation's capacity to use the seas in defiance of rivals and competitors, it consists of such diverse elements as combat craft and weapons, auxiliary craft, commercial shipping, bases, and trained personnel. Aircraft used in the control of seaborne transportation function as an instrument of sea power even when they operate from a land base; aircraft operating from carriers represent the extension of sea power even when they are attacking targets deep inland. Except for the great increase in bombardment of shore or inland targets from the sea, the functions of sea power were the same in **World War II** as they were in the 16th century, when warships specifically designed for fighting (as distinguished from armed merchantmen) first appeared.

Alfred Thayer's **Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History** was a two-volume work that argued that **sea power** was the key to military and economic expansion. Published in 1890 and 1892, the book was an instant classic that proved highly **influential** in both American and international circles.