

2. Concepts of Jomini
3. Concepts of Clausewitz

UNIT III ADVENT OF MODERN PERIOD.

1. Schlieffen Plan.
2. Concept of Helmut Von Moltke.
3. Concept of Expanding Torrent.

UNIT IV CONCEPTS ON LAND, AIR & NAVAL WARFARE.

1. Mao's theory of Guerilla warfare
2. Douhet's theory of Air Power
3. Mahan's theory of Sea Power

UNIT V NUCLEAR ERA.

1. The Impact of Nuclear weapons on Strategy
2. Strategy of Deterrence
3. Nuclear Strategies since 1945

Books Recommended for Reference:


1. **Earle Mead** : Makers of Modern Strategy
2. **Parot Peter** : Makers of Modern Strategy
3. **Tripathi. KS.** : Evolution of Nuclear Strategy



UNIT-III

TOPI-1

SCHLIEFFEN PLAN



In 1905, Schlieffen was chief of the German General Staff. Europe had effectively divided into two camps by this year – Germany, What was the **Schlieffen plan**. Germany would attack France first by traveling through Belgium, and take Paris in about 3 weeks. France would surrender once Paris was taken, and then Germany would attack Russia. The Schlieffen Plan was created by General Count Alfred von Schlieffen in December 1905. The Schlieffen Plan was the operational plan for a designated attack on France once Russia, in response to international tension, had started to mobilise her forces near the German border. The execution of the Schlieffen Plan led to Britain declaring war on Germany on August 4th, 1914. Austria

and Italy (the Triple Alliance) on one side and Britain, France and Russia (the Triple Entente) on the other. Schlieffen believed that the most decisive area for any future war in Europe would be in the western sector. Here, Schlieffen identified France as Germany's most dangerous opponent. Russia was not as advanced as France in many areas and Schlieffen believed that Russia would take six weeks to mobilise her forces and that any possible fighting on the Russian-German border could be coped with by the Germans for a few weeks while the bulk of her forces concentrated on defeating France.

Schlieffen concluded that a massive and successful surprise attack against France would be enough to put off Britain becoming involved in a continental war. This would allow Germany time (the six weeks that Schlieffen had built into his plan) to transfer soldiers who had been fighting in the successful French campaign to Russia to take on the Russians. Schlieffen also planned for the attack on France to go through Belgium and Luxemburg. Belgium had had her neutrality guaranteed by Britain in 1839 – so his strategy for success depended on Britain not supporting Belgium.

The Schlieffen Plan was revised as tension in Europe increased.

1. a devastating attack on France via Belgium as soon as Russia had announced her intention to mobilise.
2. a holding operation on the Russian/German border to be carried out if necessary and if required.
3. Germany had 6 weeks to defeat France.
4. Germany would then use her modernised rail system to move troops from the French operation to the Russian front.
5. Russia would then be attacked and defeated.

The Schlieffen Plan was daring but it had a number of glaring weaknesses:

1. The actions of Russia determined when Germany would have to start her attack on France even if she was ready or not.



2. It assumed that Russia would need six weeks to mobilise.
3. It assumed that Germany would defeat France in less than six weeks.

In fact, the attack in August 1914 nearly succeeded and was only defeated by the first Battle of the Marne. Poor communication between the frontline commanders and the army's headquarters in Berlin did not help Moltke's control of the campaign. Also the withdrawal of German troops in response to a higher than expected threat on the Russian front, meant that the Germans did not have the military clout that Schlieffen had built into his original plan. It was a plan that nearly succeeded but its success could only be measured by being 100% successful. France had to be defeated – and this did not happen. Schlieffen's speedy attack and expected defeat of France never occurred – it's failure did usher in the era of trench warfare that is so much linked to World War One.

UNIT-III

TOPIC-2

CONCEPT OF HELMUTH VON MOLTKE

Helmuth von **Moltke**, born May 25, 1848, Germany , died June 18, 1916, Berlin , chief of the German General Staff at the outbreak of World War I. Moltke's changes, which included a reduction in the size of the attacking army, were blamed for Germany's failure to win a quick victory. Map of the **Schlieffen Plan**. When Helmuth **von Moltke** replaced Alfred **von Schlieffen** as German Army Chief of Staff in 1906, he modified the **plan** by proposing that Holland was not invaded. The main route would now be through the flat plains of Flanders. He had developed the methods of **Napoleon** in accordance with altered conditions of his age, was the first to realize the great defensive power of modern firearms, and realized that an enveloping attack had become more formidable than an attempt to pierce an enemy's front. western front by reducing the right wing, the one to advance through Belgium, from 85% to 70%. One of Moltke's trademark strategies, seen in all his plans for war with Russia and France, was what has been called the offensive-defensive strategy, manoeuvring his army to cut the lines of communication of the enemy force and then dig in and defeat the enemy force trying to reestablish its lines of communication in a defensive action. And also drawn this conclusion from the combined action of the allies at the

Battle of Waterloo

Moltke realized that the increase in firepower reduced the risk a defender ran in splitting his forces, while the increase in the size of armies made outflanking maneuvers more practical. Moltke also realized that the expansion in the size of armies since the 1820s made it essentially impossible to exercise detailed control over the entire force. Moltke's main thesis was that **military strategy** had to be understood as a system of options, since it was only possible to plan the beginning of a military

operation. As a result, he considered the main task of military leaders to consist in the extensive preparation of all possible outcomes.

His thesis can be summed up by two statements, one famous and one less so, translated into English as "No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength" (or "no plan survives contact with the enemy") and "Strategy is a system of expedients".

UNIT-III

TOPIC-3

THE CONCEPT OF EXPANDING TORRENT

Advocacy by Liddell Hart

In 1917 and his so-called “**expanding torrent**” method of attack, which grew out of **infiltration tactics** introduced in 1917–18. Liddell Hart became an early advocate of air power and mechanized tank warfare. Defining strategy as “the art of distributing military **means** to fulfil the ends of policy,”



In warfare, **infiltration tactics** involve small independent light infantry forces advancing into enemy rear areas, bypassing enemy frontline strongpoints, possibly isolating them for attack by follow-up troops with heavier weapons.

The "**Expanding Torrent**" System of Attack Against Defence Distributed in Depth. In modern **war**, armies are distributed in great depth, and the attackers are faced with the problem of breaking through a series of positions **extending** back in layers to a depth of several miles.

On the one hand, if we press forward at full speed beyond the gap without attempting to widen it simultaneously, it is risky. We lose the weight of our blow because we cannot push adequate reserves through a bottle neck. We lose time

because the passage through a narrow gap causes delay and confusion. We endanger our security because we leave the enemy on our flanks untouched, and so able to cut off the head of our advance.

These **tactics** emerged gradually during **World War I**

While a specialist tactic during World War I, infiltration tactics are now regularly fully integrated as standard part of the modern **maneuver warfare**, down to basic **fire and movement** at the **squad and section** level, so the term has little distinct meaning today. Infiltration tactics may not be standard in modern combat where training is limited, such as for **militia** or rushed conscript units, or in desperate attacks where an immediate victory is required. Examples are German ***Volksgrenadier*** formations at the end of World War II, and Japanese **banzai attacks** of the same period.

Forms of these **infantry tactics** were used by **skirmishers and irregulars** dating back to **classical antiquity**, but only as a defensive or secondary tactic;

Infantry in Defence.

The defence is simply the attack halted. Any unit which halts its advance is capable on account of its open and self-contained formation of offering an immediate resistance to any hostile attack or counter attack.