

B.A. DEFENCE STUDIES

Year	Subject Title	Sem.	Sub Code
2018 -19 Onwards	CORE X IV: STRATEGIC THOUGHT	VI	18BDS62C

Objective:

Importance of certain strategic concepts that are time tested and have everlasting value is outlined in this paper. Learners will understand and appreciate the concepts that shaped many events in military history.

Credits: 5

UNIT I INTRODUCTION:

1. Concept of Strategic Thought
2. Gandhi and Non -Violence
3. Nehru and Non-Alignment

UNIT II PRE- WORLD WAR THINKERS.

1. Concepts of Machiavelli
2. Concepts of Jomini
3. Concepts of Clausewitz

UNIT-II

TOPIC-1

The Concept of Virtue in Machiavelli's The Prince

Most of the contemporary readers when hearing about Niccolo Machiavelli they think of a deceitful person who had spent most of his time on producing malicious contents which are harmful to normal people. In summary, Machiavelli was an Italian philosopher according to Stanford Machiavelli never considered himself as a philosopher, but because of his qualities he can completely fit in philosophy (2005, Stanford) and politician who born in 1469 in Florence, Italy who had authored one of the most influential books related to the modern politics: The Prince. The entire book is about principles of being a powerful prince. Basically, Machiavelli in The Prince explores various aspects of being a leader such as virtue. He used the Italian word virtue multiple times in his book. However, the definition of the Virtù in his book is a bit different from the cognate word virtue in English. Nevertheless, it is somehow related to the Virtue we all are already familiar with. According to Machiavelli's political context, the word virtue comes to the scene not only for describing the traditional ethical sense but to signify the required skills, manners and morals for playing the role of a successful leader. In order to figure out what Machiavelli means by the word virtue, we have to take a deeper look at The Prince to notice when he used the term of virtue to illustrate persona and their actions. As Terence Ball mentioned: "There are, in Machiavelli's view, at least two different concepts of virtue: one for private citizens, another for princes." (1994, pp. 521). Machiavelli's opinion of virtue for princes is completely steady with the merciless instructions determined in the Prince (Ball, 1994). My aim in this text is to clarify why the term of virtue is one of the main subjects in Machiavelli's book, the Prince. As the word Virtue is the main subject of our text we have to clarify the original meaning of it clearly. Overall, Virtù is amongst the most dialectical moral concepts that have no exact equivalent in the English language which is already clear for every researcher in the context of Machiavelli's book (Ball, 1994). However, it seems the word has derived from Latin word Virtus which has almost the same meaning with the word that Machiavelli used in the Prince. However, it is not totally similar to the Latin word but at least same in one aspect. The word Virtus acquires from vir (man) but it should not be misunderstood as a similar to the 'Human Being'. (Ball, 1994). Originally, Virtus assigns multiple personal qualities to a person such as honesty and justice. Basically, Machiavelli used the word virtue multiple times in his book to refer the total required qualities for being a powerful leader. However, other concepts of virtue exist as well. For instance, the Christian virtue is composed of a variety of qualifications like modesty and alms which almost every religion have encouraged people to have them. According to them, these are attitudes

which every person despite any indicator could have. As Terence Ball mentioned: "The Christian concept of virtue, in other words, has no necessary with public or political life; is concerned primarily with private life and only tangentially, if at all, with the public realm." (1994). Ultimately, Machiavelli's virtue is some way separate from other concepts virtue. If we look deeper, the word virtue is the translation of the Greek word Aretè. To understand it better, the easier translation would be "role-related specific excellence". Aretè means the main feature of anyone or anything. For instance, the Aretè of a teacher would be a high level of skill in teaching or the Aretè of a dog could be loyalty. Machiavelli's personal concept of virtue is different from other forms of virtue, although it can be observed that the word Aretè has the closest meaning to his concept of virtue. In other words, virtue in the Prince is the political edition of Aretè for Machiavelli. Now that the definition of Virtue is nearly explained, the question is who are some of the virtues leaders in Machiavelli's belief? Machiavelli tried to add examples of rulers who were virtuous in the Prince. He has written fifty-three names of individuals to describe virtuous kings exactly. Machiavelli is known for his belief that the private life should not affect political behavior. Related to this, Sydney Angelo mentioned in his book Machiavelli: A Dissection that "Machiavelli has come to be particularly identified with the divorce political from private morality, with the doctrine of expediency in political action, and with the mode of justifying all political means on ground of reason of state, as do less to his uniqueness than to the dynamic way in which he expressed these ideas." He believes that a ruler should choose his priority based on the rights of the state. Depending on the situation a prince might make even a cruel decision as the necessity has no law. It is an old argumentative subject amongst politicians and philosophers that the leaders should close their eyes on their own interest oftentimes because of political survival. Machiavelli argues pessimistically about nature of being a ruler and needed virtues for saving the realm. Machiavelli describes men as unstable, egocentric, unfavorable, and weak about appearances. Also, because they only do good under restriction, it is better to be feared than to be loved. (Angelo, 1969). Naturally, he believes that people tend to be evil rather than being good. According to his belief, in different situations, the prince must be prepared to do anything in order to save his position such as lying, cheating somebody, making cruel decisions, murdering a court member or breaking treaties. But what is the reason that a prince should always be like this? Perhaps Machiavelli considers that being a leader, king or prince is a massive title. During the history, only a few people have become leaders. In other words, it's a great fortune. Consequently, in order to save this title and the whole state, leaders should maintain it. However, things get clearer when we notice than offenses that a leader does are not the "natural and ordinary necessity" in the beginning of chapter three. Machiavelli has written in the mentioned chapter that the second necessity in political position "requires that one must always offend those over whom he becomes a new prince" Reading more accurately, it can be observed that this is a rhetorical passage that let the reader decide about it. Rafael Major, related to this passage writes: "This passage is kind of rhetorical sleight of hand-leading the reader to believe that a consequence of the necessity is itself the necessity". Machiavelli then explained that the second natural and ordinary necessity should be something like self-defense. A leader most always is aware of enemies. He must always be one step forward if he wants to protect his position. It is somehow reasonable to behave similarly to the Machiavelli's the Prince as a leader when the history has shown us that in the most of the court's political corruption has happened. To conclude, I assume that with the passage of time, the true meaning of Machiavelli in the Prince becomes obvious. As I mentioned before, the meaning of virtue is getting clearer as we look deeply into it. The total qualifications that a leader needs in different contexts mean virtue to Niccolo Machiavelli. In his belief, those features, virtues, sometimes make

leaders do actions for state necessity. Whether it is a cruel action or kind. However, most of the time Machiavelli says that it's better to be feared than to be loved when leaders cannot be both. From my point of view, subjects that Machiavelli has mentioned in the Prince are currently happening in several countries around the globe. Sometimes commonplace people do not want to believe the reality of something which is normally based on their emotions. But Machiavelli has written his book very realistic as the politics are in the group of most dangerous and hardest things in comparison with other positions.

UNIT-II

TOPIC-2

Antoine Henri Jomini

Baron Antoine Henri Jomini (1779-1869) drew on his experience in the armies of French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte to write the first systematic study of military strategy. The science of warfare as outlined in his *Précis de l'art de la guerre* (The Art of War) has been studied by military commanders in the years since Jomini's death, and it continues to influence the way modern warfare is waged, discussed, and studied. Baron Antoine Henri Jomini rose in the ranks of the Swiss army, eventually serving under Marshall Michel Ney as chief of staff and becoming a baron in 1807. Loyal to French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, Jomini distinguished himself in 1806 at the battle of Jena as well as during France's takeover of Spain. His continued fame rests on his now-classic 1836 *Précis de l'art de guerre*, which advocates the use of large land forces, speed, maneuverability, and the capture of strategic points during battle. Jomini's work remained influential with military leaders throughout the 1800s, most notably during the U.S. Civil War. Jomini was born on March 6, 1779, in the town of Payerne, located in the Swiss canton of Vaud. His parents, of Italian descent, were of modest means and gave their son a good education. As a child he was fascinated by soldiers and the art of war and was eager to attend the Prince de Wurtemberg's military academy in Montbelliard, but his family's circumstances did not permit this. Unable to afford a commission in the Swiss Watteville regiment then under the command of the French, at age 14 he was sent to business school in Aarau with the intent that he train for a career. In April of 1795 he moved to Basle where he found a clerical position at the banking house of *Monsieurs Preiswerk*. Moving to Paris in 1796, Jomini worked as a bank clerk for *Monsieurs Mosselmann* before leaving to become a stockbroker in partnership with another young man. Napoleon's successes in Italy at Lodi, Castiglione, and Lonato inspired Jomini to begin to write on military matters, and he began to study comparative warfare in earnest. His first published study of military operations were that of Frederick II. In 1798 he left his business career behind to reenlist in the Swiss army where he was appointed aide-de-camp to the minister of war of the Helvetic Republic.

Formulated Military Theory

In 1799 Jomini was appointed bureau chief within the Swiss war office, and in the following months, now with the rank of major, he reorganized the ministry for the Swiss War. He drew on his growing knowledge of military operations to standardize several procedures, taking advantage of his position to experiment with organizational systems and strategies. Leaving Switzerland in 1801, Jomini

returned to Paris and worked for two years at a military equipment manufacturer before abandoning commerce for good and beginning the first of his books dealing with military theory and history, *Traité des grandes opérations militaires*. In this work, published in eight volumes between 1804 and 1810 and translated as *Treatise on Grand Military Operations*, Jomini presented an overview of the general principles of warfare. He included a critical history of the military actions of Frederick II, "the Great," during the Seven Years' War, contrasting them unfavorably with the battles waged by Napoleon Bonaparte. Not surprisingly, this work caught the attention of the French emperor, who eventually offered Jomini a position within his own ranks.

Jomini's *Traité des grandes opérations militaires* was the first of several works, including *Principes de la stratégie* (1818), and the 15-volume, 1819-1824 work *Histoire critique et militaire des guerres de la Révolution*, which addressed the wars of the French Revolution. The grossly inept early campaigns of the French Revolution had, in fact, inspired Jomini's search for scientific principles underlying successful warfare, but he waited to publish his *Histoire critique* until most of the generals he criticized were dead. In each of his writings he described actual battles and theorized why the actions taken either were successful or failed. A child of the Enlightenment, he sought to determine the laws of military strategy, inviolate scientific principles that could be followed to wage a successful war. Such laws would, Jomini believed, provide continuity among the diverse forces at work within an army and thus make war controlled and of minimal duration. Ironically, Jomini was at first unable to gain entrance into either the French or Russian military on the basis of his *Traité des grandes opérations militaires*, the implication being that one so young had little to teach older and far more experienced generals. Finally his work came to the attention of Marshal Ney, who took Jomini into his staff in 1805 and provided the funds necessary for the young man to publish his book. Jomini fought with the Sixth Corps against Austria at Ulm in 1805 and served as senior-aide-de-camp against the Prussian Army at Jena and Bautzen the following year. Following the 1807 peace of Tilsit, he was created Baron of the Empire on July 27, 1808, in recognition of his service. During Napoleon's campaigns to take Spain in 1808, he fought bravely and was made brigade general in 1810. When the French army retreated from Russia Jomini also handled his role commendably and was appointed brigadier general in 1813. Throughout his career in the army of Napoleon, Jomini exhibited complete confidence in his ability to discern "correct" and "incorrect" strategies in line with his theories. Such confidence was interpreted as arrogance by many officers, including Murat and Marshal Berthier, who likely also resented the preferential treatment given to the younger man by Napoleon. In August of 1813, as the result of efforts by Berthier to discredit him and sabotage a well-earned promotion to major general following Ney's victory at the battle of Bautzen, Jomini was forced from the French ranks. Angered and humiliated at his treatment, he traded allegiances, left France, and joined the Russian Army as lieutenant general and aide-de-camp to Alexander I. Aiding in Russia in ending Napoleon's efforts to conquer Eastern Europe, Jomini was allowed to abstain from all military action that took place on French soil. Advancing to general-in-chief in the service of Russia in 1826, he became the military tutor of the Tzarevich Nicholas. As one of his final duties in the Russian military, Jomini was put in charge of organizing the Russian staff college in 1830. Under Bonaparte, the French had revolutionized warfare by decentralizing command, using a predominately conscripted force and vesting both political and military power in a single leader. Influenced by Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Caesar, Napoleon had little concern for individual victories or defeats, and even placed the conquest of land secondary; he focused on the overall goal of destroying his enemy through a massed concentration of force. The observation of Napoleon's

battle strategy strongly influenced Jomini's theory and became the foundation of his greatest work, 1836's *Precis de l'art de la guerre*, translated in 1862 as *The Art of War*, which was written to provide military instruction for the Grand Duke of Russia, the future Nicholas I. Jomini believed that after the age of Napoleon, war would no longer be considered the private affair of individual monarchs; instead it would be waged nation against nation. In his *Precis* he defined for the first time the three main categories of military activity strategy, tactics, and logistics and postulated his "Fundamental Principle of War."

Jomini's "Fundamental Principle of War" involved four maxims:

- 1) To maneuver the mass of the army, successively upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and attack the enemy's lines of communication as frequently as possible while still protecting ones own;
- 2) To quickly maneuver and engage fractions of the enemy's army with the majority of one's own;
- 3) To focus the attack on a "decisive point," such as weak or undefended areas in the enemy lines;
- 4) To economize one's own force on supporting attacks so that the focus of effort could attack preferably by surprise the decisive point at the proper time with sufficient force.

He also advocated use of the turning movement, through which an adversary was overcome by moving beyond its position and attacking from the rear, and believed that adversaries in retreat should continue to be pursued as a means of beating them psychologically. He viewed leadership as a prime requirement for military success and appraised character as "above all other requisites in a commander in chief." However, he also recognized that a commander who possessed great character but lacked intellectual training would never be a great general; the necessary characteristic of a winning general would be the combination of intellect and natural leadership. Jomini strongly advocated simplicity and praised the Napoleonic strategy of a quick victory gained by quickly massing troops, as well as the French general's objective of capturing capital cities as a signal of defeat. He also provided early definitions for modern concepts such as the "theater of operation." Jomini cared little for the political niceties of war; in his view governments choose the best commander possible, then free that person to wage war as he deems appropriate.

Influence Spanned the Centuries

Jomini's writings, which constitute over 25 translated works, continued to influence military leaders in both Europe and North America for much of the nineteenth century. His systematization of Napoleon's *modus operandi* became accepted military doctrine during the U.S. Civil War and was used by generals at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. However, more recent scholars have viewed Jomini as a chronicler of pre-modern warfare. As a military strategist, he was often compared with Prussian contemporary Karl Marie von Clausewitz (1780-1831), whose 1833 treatise *Vom Kriege* was considered by many scholars to be romanticized. Unlike Clausewitz, Jomini was vague and contradicted himself on the importance of genius. Like Clausewitz, however, his focus remained on the Napoleonic "great battle" rather than the more modern war composed of multiple armed encounters. Among Jomini's other writings was a well-received 1864 *Life of Napoleon* and a political and military history of Napoleon's Waterloo campaign. After publishing his *Precis*, Jomini retired from the Russian military. He moved to Brussels, but continued to be sought out for his expertise. In 1854 Jomini was called to advise the future Czar Nicholas I on the Crimean War and was consulted by French leader Napoleon III on the 1859 Italian campaign. Until 1888 he was considered by the English to be preeminent among military strategists, and his books were required reading in military

academies. U.S. generals such as George B. McClellan and Robert E. Lee were said to have gone into battle armed with a sword in one hand and Jomini's Summary of the Art of War in the other. Reported to be of sound mind as late as his nineties, Jomini continued to insist that his principles would endure despite the changing face of modern warfare as a result of the development of technological advances such as railways and telegraphs. He died on March 24, 1869, at his home in Passy, France.

UNIT-II

TOPIC-3

Clausewitz's Concept of Strategy ;

Concerned that an early death might prematurely terminate his masterwork, *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz wrote a number of introductory notes describing the purpose of his manuscript and the direction he intended to take with future revisions. Four such notes inform our understanding of *On War* and Clausewitz's intent: the "Author's Preface" written between 1816-18; While we may never know for certain whether the undated note was written before or after the note of 1827, its contents still remain important to our understanding of Clausewitz as a military thinker. Although the note of 1827 contains the essential elements of Clausewitz's ideas as we know them today (e.g., the distinction between absolute and limited war, and his belief that "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means"), the undated note, whether placed before or after the note of 1827, adds another dimension to Clausewitz's military thought. In short, it suggests that he was on the verge of developing a theory of applied strategy, or an operational-level theory for the conduct of war. In particular, the last paragraph of the undated note reveals that Clausewitz had identified several "statements" (or "secondary propositions" as Peter Paret has called them) which might be used to guide the conduct of operations: "It is a very difficult task to construct a scientific theory for the art of war, and so many attempts have failed that most people say that it is impossible, since it deals with matters that no permanent law can provide for. One would agree and abandon the attempt were it not for the obvious fact that a whole range of propositions can be demonstrated without difficulty: that defense is the stronger form of fighting with a negative purpose, attack the weaker form with a positive purpose; that major successes help bring about minor ones, that a demonstration is a weaker use of force than a real attack, that victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy's physical and psychic forces, that success is always greatest at the point where victory was gained, that a turning movement can only be justified by general superiority, that flank-positions are governed by the same consideration; that every attack loses impetus as it progresses [emphasis added]." As it stands, the list is certainly incomplete. Clausewitz might also have included other important operational concepts such as center of gravity, concentration, and economy of force.⁸ Those that he did mention appear throughout the corpus of *On War*, and, based on thematic similarities between the last two paragraphs of the undated note and Chapter 1 of Book VIII, seem to have been compiled, as does the undated note itself, while Clausewitz was in the process of writing or rewriting Books VI-VIII. This essay examines each of the secondary propositions, excepting Clausewitz's statement that a "demonstration is a weaker use of force than a real attack," as it is merely a definition, and suggests that they do in fact represent principles -- as Clausewitz had defined the term -- for a theory of applied strategy. Before proceeding further, however, we must understand that, in general,

Clausewitz recognized only two levels of war: strategic the use of battles to achieve the military and political objective of the war; and tactical the art of winning battles. He saw the conduct of operations as an integral part of strategy, or the art of war, but he used the terms "art of war" *Kriegskunst*, "strategy" *Strategie*, and "conduct of war" *Kriegführung*, almost interchangeably. But, in Books VI-VIII, which reflect most of his mature theories, he focused almost exclusively on the conduct of operations, or the practical execution of strategy. These books contain a number of observations concerning "campaign plans" *Feldzugsplanen*, "theaters of war" *Kriegstheater*, "individual armies' zones of operations" *einzelnen Heergebiete*, and "principles for the execution of strategy" *Grundsätze der Mittel und Wege* as they applied to defense and attack and to limited and unlimited war hence, the term applied strategy.

To fully understand the significance of his list of propositions, we must also review Clausewitz's concept of theory. "The primary purpose of any theory," he wrote, "is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled." theory should explain rather than prescribe. It should reflect reality or, in Clausewitz's words, the "world of action," which is governed, as he saw it, by a logical hierarchy consisting of laws, principles, rules, and prescriptions and methods. Laws are universal and absolute; they reveal the cause-and-effect relationship between things, and determine action (e.g., Newton's Laws of Motion). In Clausewitz's opinion, laws did not belong in a theory of war, since the phenomenon of war consisted of "too much change and diversity" to allow action to be traced to a single cause; nonetheless, he used the term law on numerous occasions. Principles are deductions reflecting only the "spirit and sense" of a law; they may be universal but they are not absolute (e.g., all available force should be concentrated at the decisive point). Principles provide a guide for action they allow for the diversity common to combat situations but call upon the commander to exercise sound judgment in their application. Rules are inferences based on experience. Rules resemble principles--they are not absolute; they rest on a truth but allow for exceptions (e.g., cavalry should not be used against unbroken infantry), but they are more specific than principles. Prescriptions and methods are merely the regulations and routines which armies develop to handle their day-to-day business (e.g., standard operating procedures, drill manuals, etc.) Each of these components represents a "nucleus of truth" which theory must address. Clausewitz's next task was to combine these elements under a single, unifying theme a controlling element in his words, a "point at which all lines converge." This controlling element, the foundation for his theory, had to maintain a balance between the "three magnets" of the remarkable trinity blind emotional force, chance, and reason which provided a framework, or model, for understanding war's changeable and diverse nature: "These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deeply-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless."

Although the "remarkable trinity" itself was not a theory, per se, Clausewitz believed that it provided the basis for one. Originally, the concept of battle or the engagement fighting itself supplied Clausewitz's single, unifying theme linking the various components of his theory of strategy: "Strategy is nothing without battle, for battle is the material that it applies, the very means that it employs. Just as tactics is the employment of military forces in battle, so strategy is the employment of battles to achieve the object of war." Fighting, including the threat of a fight, became the "essential military activity," and the destruction of the enemy's forces served as Clausewitz's "overriding principle of war." [Battle as the Central Element in Clausewitz's Theory of War] While Gat

has correctly argued the Clausewitz's crisis involved the threat that limited wars posed to his overall conception of war, he overlooked the significance of the last paragraph of the undated note. A passage from Chapter 30 of Book VI, reveals Clausewitz's problem more clearly: "Now we come to another question: whether a set of all-encompassing principles, rules, and methods may be formulated for these endeavors. Our reply must be that history has not guided us to any recurrent forms . A war in which great decisions are involved is not only simpler but also less inconsistent .In such a case, reason can make rules and laws, but in the type of war we have been describing this seems far more difficult. Two main principles for the conduct of major wars have evolved in our own time: "breadth of a base" and Jomini's "interior lines." Even these, when actually applied to the defense of an operational theater, have never proved to be absolute and effective. Yet this is where, as purely formal principles, they should be at their most effective ... It is plain that circumstances exert an influence that cuts across all general principles .We admit, in short, that in this chapter we cannot formulate any principles, rules, or methods: history does not provide a basis for them."From this passage it is clear that Clausewitz's crisis involved the tri-namic tension between history (change over time), the "influence of circumstances," and the applicability of "general principles" to the conduct of war itself. The undated note, then, reflects his belief that a theory of war was possible; and that, as his list of secondary propositions suggests, it could be found at the level of applied strategy. The remainder of this essay will thus discuss the significance of each proposition. 1. The Relationship between Defense and Attack. By claiming that the defense was the stronger form of war, Clausewitz challenged directly the military norm of his day (and many others) which maintained that the opposite was true. He reasoned that a combatant chose the defensive form of warfare because he was not strong enough either materially or morally to attack. The advantages provided by the defensive form of war (e.g., cover and concealment, shorter lines of supply, time, choice and preparation of the terrain, etc.) compensate for the defender's material or moral weakness, at least partially. Moreover, the defender's aim is merely self-preservation, a condition which is met even before the attacker begins to move and, in some cases, can be met even if the defender's army is defeated in battle (e.g., Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army). The attacker, on the other hand, enjoys few, if any, of the advantages of the defender and, in fact, has the burden of launching and sustaining the attack, for which he generally needs a significant advantage, either moral or material, or both. Thus, the defensive form of warfare is stronger because it affords more advantages to the side that adopts it while at the same time making fewer demands. But because the characteristic feature of the defense is waiting, and its goal preservation, it possesses a negative purpose. The offensive form of warfare, on the other hand, seeks to obtain or to conquer; hence, Clausewitz assigned it a positive purpose. Stating that one form of warfare is stronger than another is of course not the same as advocating the one over the other. Clausewitz was quick to point out that neither form of war existed independently. A well-conducted defense, he wrote, usually consisted of many offensive blows (e.g., counterattacks and spoiling attacks): "One cannot think of the defense without that necessary component of the concept, the counterattack. Even in a defensive position awaiting the enemy assault, our bullets take the offensive."¹⁸ Likewise, attackers must occasionally employ defensive measures to gain time or to re-locate forces, particularly if the resources to press forward continuously and evenly across an entire front are not available (e.g., Allied defensive operations in the Ardennes in the fall of 1944). Thus, "the act of attack, particularly in strategy, is a constant alternation and combination of attack and defense." 2. Relationship between Major and Minor Successes The proposition that major successes help bring about minor ones derives from Clausewitz's general assumption that war, like every real phenomenon, consisted of a number of

interdependent elements, when one was affected so, too, were the others, even if only minimally. Statements like, "small things always depend on great ones," or conversely, "that great tactical successes lead to great strategic ones," reflect this belief.*20 In turn, Clausewitz's experience as a soldier taught him that the material and moral superiority gained from large victories often led to smaller ones. For example, the defeat of the main Prussian army at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 led to a number of smaller garrisons and depots falling rather quickly into French hands. As Clausewitz wrote: "The outcome of a major battle has a greater psychological effect on the loser than on the winner. This, in turn, gives rise to additional loss of material strength, which is echoed in loss of morale; the two become mutually interactive as each enhances and intensifies the other. So one must place special emphasis on the moral effect, which works in opposite directions on each side: while sapping the strength of the loser, it raises the vigor and energy of the winner. But the defeated side is the one most affected by it, since it becomes the direct cause of additional loss. Moreover, it is closely related to the dangers, exertions, and hardships -- in brief, to all the wear and tear inseparable from war. It merges with these conditions and is nurtured by them." With this passage, Clausewitz did more than anticipate the modern offensive phases of exploitation and pursuit. He in fact recognized an overall interconnectedness of events within a particular theater of war, especially in terms of morale, such that a victorious outcome in one battle might contribute to success in others as well.

3. Conditions of Victory.

Clausewitz derived his proposition that "victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy's physical and psychic forces" from the conditions of victory as he defined them for both the strategic and tactical levels of war. On the strategic level, Clausewitz wrote that victory in war required:

- 1) the complete or partial destruction of the enemy's armed forces;
- 2) the occupation of his country;
- 3) the breaking of his will to fight.

The political object, the original motive, for which the war was fought determines the extent to which each of these objectives is to be pursued.

On the tactical level, victory involves:

- 1) the enemy's greater loss of material strength;
- 2) his loss of morale;
- 3) his admission of the same by abandoning his intentions. The loss of the enemy's moral and physical forces, as Clausewitz pointed out, need not be actual. It can, and often is merely the threat of loss which is sufficient to bring about the surrender or capitulation of enemy forces. Moreover, for Clausewitz, breaking the enemy's morale possessed far more significance than the destruction of his material strength: "In the engagement, the loss of morale has proved the major decisive factor ... [it] becomes the means of achieving the margin of profit in the destruction of the enemy's physical forces which is the real purpose of the engagement [emphasis added]." Indeed, the continued

resistance of the French population after the battle of Sedan supports Clausewitz's emphasis on the psychological or irrational element of war. While the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs provides significant advantages to technology-based societies, the concept of a Peoples' War remains its Achilles heel, thereby underscoring the crucial role that cultural values, ideologies, and belief systems play in motivating a society for war.

4. Turning Movements and Flank Positions.

Envelopments and turning movements are similar in nature. Their basic definitions have not changed since Clausewitz's day. Envelopments are maneuvers around or over the enemy's position, avoiding his strength, to strike at his flanks and rear. A turning movement is a variant of the envelopment in which the attacker avoids the defense entirely in order to seek key terrain deep in the enemy's rear and along his lines of communication, thus forcing him to abandon his position. "The enveloping or turning movement," Clausewitz wrote, "may have two objectives. It may aim at disrupting, or cutting, communications, causing the army to wither and die, and thus be forced to retreat; or it may aim at cutting off the retreat itself." Because such movements expose one's own lines of communication to attack, Clausewitz argued that "flanking operations, which have always been more popular in books than in the field," are rarely practicable, and "dangerous only to very long and vulnerable lines of communication." Even the threat of being cut off, he maintained, should not be overrated; "experience has shown that where the troops are good and their commanders bold they are more likely to break through than be trapped."

Clausewitz defined a flank position as "any position that is meant to be held even though the enemy may pass it by: once he has, the only effect it can have is on his strategic flank."³¹ This definition included all fortified positions since they are, in theory at least, "impregnable," and any unfortified position which happens to be cut off, regardless of whether it faces parallel or perpendicular to the enemy's line of advance (e.g., the Prussian position on the Saale during Napoleon's advance in 1806). He considered such flank positions effective if they cause the attacker to hesitate, but risky, particularly in the case of unfortified ones, if the attacker proceeded unchecked, since, as Clausewitz explained, "the defender will pretty well have lost his chances of retreat."

The development of rapid-firing, long-range rifles and machine guns in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made flanking operations more appealing to armies who wanted to close with the enemy while avoiding his deadly frontal fire. Moltke the Elder (Chief of Staff of the German General Staff, 1857-1888) seems to have perfected the technique of tactical envelopment in Germany's wars against Austria and France in 1866 and 1870 respectively. To Count Alfred von Schlieffen (Chief of Staff of the German General Staff, 1891-1905), however, flank attacks became something of an obsession -- they were the "essential element in all of military history."

Rather than treat the act of "falling on the enemy's rear" as an accomplishment in itself, "a prize exhibit," or a formula for success, Clausewitz soberly argued that flanking operations in general were most effective only under the following conditions:

- 1) while on the strategic defensive;
- 2) toward the end of a campaign, when the enemy's lines of communication have been extended;
- 3) especially during a retreat into the interior of the country;

4) in conjunction with armed insurrection. All of these conditions, save the last, were present in MacArthur's famous landing at Inchon during the Korean conflict, a classic turning movement that saved UN forces from defeat. As the lethality of the battlefield continues to increase, envelopments (including those vertical in nature) and turning movements are likely to gain even greater significance as forms of maneuver.

5. The Diminishing Force of the Attack, The Culminating Point of the Attack, and the Culminating Point of Victory.

Clausewitz saw the diminishing force of the attack, the culminating point of the attack, and the culminating point of victory as related concepts. Anticipating the modern concept of strategic consumption, Clausewitz wrote: "All attackers find that their strength diminishes as they advance." He then went on to identify seven factors which cause the depletion of the attackers strength:

1) occupation of the enemy's country;

2) the need to secure lines of communication;

3) losses incurred through combat and sickness;

4) the distance from replacements of both material and personnel;

5) by sieges and investment of fortresses;

6) by a reduction of effort (moral and physical);

7) by the defection of allies. Yet, he was also quick to point out that "a weakening of the attack may be partially or completely cancelled out by a weakening of the defense." Thus, the depletion of the attacker's strength, while demonstrably true, has no meaning unless it is considered in relation to the strength of the defender. Drawing directly from his observations concerning the diminishing force of the attack, Clausewitz concluded that most attacks do not lead directly to the end of hostilities, but instead reach a culminating point at which the "superior strength of the attack[er] is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace." By way of corollary, Clausewitz determined that the moral and physical superiority gained through a successful battle generally augmented the strength of the victor, adding to his superiority, but only to a certain extent, and this he called the culminating point of victory. This circumstance, he pointed out, was particularly evident in wars in which it was not possible for the victor to completely defeat his opponent. The same factors that contributed to reducing the strength of the attacker also played a role in diminishing the moral and material superiority that a military force gained through victory:

The utilization of a victory, a continued advance in an offensive campaign, will usually swallow up the superiority with which one began or which was gained by the victory.... This culminating point in victory is bound to recur in every future war in which the destruction of the enemy cannot be the military aim, and this will presumably be true of most wars. The natural goal of all campaign plans, therefore, is the turning point at which attack becomes defense [the culminating point of the attack]." In short, attacks that did not result in peace must end in defense. To proceed beyond the culminating point of the attack merely invited disaster, for it was erroneous to assume "that so long as an attack progresses there must still be some superiority on its side." Clausewitz continued: "It is

therefore important to calculate this point correctly when planning the campaign. An attacker may otherwise take on more than he can manage ; a defender must be able to recognize this error if the enemy commits it, and exploit it to the full." Both Napoleon's and Hitler's campaigns in Russia serve as ample illustrations of what can happen when an attacker exceeds his culminating point. Unfortunately, Clausewitz's step toward a theory of applied strategy remained only that; and it is impossible to say precisely where he would have gone with his list of propositions. On the one hand, he might have used a triangular structure similar to that of the remarkable trinity, which explained the nature of war, to clarify applied strategy. Clausewitz might thus have set his list of principles in opposition to his elements of strategy (Book III) which, because they vary with each situation, account for the uniqueness of strategic operations in general:

- 1) the moral - intellectual and psychological factors (e.g., genius of the commander and spirit of the army);
- 2) the physical army size and composition;
- 3) the mathematical -geometric factors (e.g., angles of impact and flanking fires);
- 4) the geographical the influence of terrain;
- 5) the statistical -- support and maintenance. In addition, Clausewitz's concept of a center of gravity, Schwerpunkt, which became an integral part of his later discussions regarding the conduct of war, offers perhaps the best controlling element for a theory of applied strategy.

His framework for a theory of applied strategy might thus have looked like this:

Clausewitz defined Schwerpunkt as 'the center of all power and movement (Zentrum der Kraft und Bewegung) upon which everything depends. The concept itself originated with Clausewitz's belief in the near-metaphysical interdependency of all elements and all levels of war; it also reflects the extent to which the holistic and harmonizing tendencies of German idealism had influenced him. Paradoxically, the center of gravity represents both the predominant strengths and weaknesses of the geo-political or politico-military position of each belligerent state relative to its allies and opponents: if it is removed, impaired, or destroyed, then the alliance or state that it supported would collapse. Although he argued that the 'destruction of the enemy's fighting force is the best way to begin,' Clausewitz saw moral and physical force as separate but related sources of strength; hence, he recognized more than one possibility for a center of gravity, namely, an enemy's army, his capital, alliance systems, personalities of leaders, and public opinion. In general, however, these last pertain more to the level of strategy than applied strategy. We can only wonder whether in subsequent revisions of *On War* Clausewitz would have developed the concept further. On the other hand, he might simply have developed his list of propositions into a more sophisticated set of principles of war to replace those that he had prepared for the Crown Prince. Indeed, many of the chapters in Book III correspond to the principles of war as we know them today. In any case, Clausewitz certainly needed to rewrite Book III (Strategy), formally addressing the relationship between the principles of applied strategy and strategic operations in general, paying particular attention to conflicts short of war.

Conclusion

Clausewitz's approach to theory itself differed from others in that he attempted to account for all the impediments to action, all the imponderables—genius, chance, friction, uncertainty, etc.—and all the variations in scenario that result from the particularity of individual circumstances and prevent war from becoming a science. Given the predictions of the day, Clausewitz's response to the crisis in theory was itself rather astonishing—he redefined the term 'theory.' Rather than using it to mean formula or established procedure, as most Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinkers of his time had done, he redefined it in broader terms to indicate a 'framework for study' or a 'basis for conceptualization.'