

UNIT-IV

TOPIC-1

Expedition of Somnath

Somnath was famous then, as a great Shiva shrine described in detail in the Skanda Purana of the 9th century A.D. and also mentioned by Al-Beruni both as a sacred place and a resort of pirates. The expedition of Somnath was the crowning event in the idol – breaking and plundering career of Mahmud of Ghazni a Turkish ruler. The location of Somanatha was earlier referred to as Prathasa Pattana, a well known Tirtha or place of pilgrimage in Saurashtra. It is situated on the west coast of Kathiawar and is at present under Junagadh. It was associated with the nearby confluence of three rivers and it adjoined the port of Veraval. Mahmud of Ghazni plundered the Somanath temple and there are multiple versions of the event in Turko-Persian sources. Al-Beruni writes that the temple was built of stone and ‘constructed about 100 years prior to Mahmud’s attack (which would date it to the 10th century) that it was set in a fortress surrounded by the sea on 3 sides – presumably; its wealth had to be guarded. Al-Beruni states that the upper part of the icon was broken at the orders of Mahmud and parts of it were taken back as loot to Ghazni and placed so that people would walk on it. Mahmud’s raids caused economic devastation and the Turks were hated among the people who suffered because of these raids. Mahmud began series of seventeen invasions into northwestern India at the end of the 10th century his 16th expedition was the plunder of Somnath temple (dedicated to Shiva) in 1025 A.D. the Somnath temple is one of the twelve Jyotirlingas (golden Lingas) symbols of the god Shiva. Somnath mean “the protector of moon god”. It is known as the “shrine external” as although the temple has been destroyed six times it has been rebuilt every single time. The Pratihara king Nagabhata II constructed the 3rd temple in 815 A.D. the temple was built upon 56 pillars of wood covered with lead.

Islamic Plunder of Somnath Temple

Destroying places of worship of other faiths has been a trademark sign of Mohammad’s followers for last 14 centuries. In New Delhi, there is a late 12th century mosque adjacent to Qutub Minar, called Quwwat ul Mosque (Might of Islam). It was built from ruins of 27 Temples. While the leftist and Islamic historians might cockily call it “Might of Islam”, in reality it should be called “Shame of Humanity”. In fact, practically every Islamic structure created by Mohammadans in

the past centuries can be rightly called “Shame of Humanity”. They all fill right thinking Muslims with utter shame and disgust. Many are even outraged to discover that they have been fooled into worshipping mass killers and destroyers as “Islamic Heroes.”

But why do Mohammadans destroy Temples and Churches and even Buddha Statues? One, because their medieval mind thinks that it glorifies their ultra-special imaginary “Only god” whom they call Allah. Two, their holy-Book written by Arab tribals wants them to humiliate non-Muslims and insult their faith. Yes, humiliating and insulting non-Muslims is prescribed as a Holy Islamic Duty ! And, dying doing so is still holier it instantly transports them to Allah’s Heaven where virgins provide them eternal sex-pleasure!! Even in today’s 21st century digital world, nothing has changed in their thinking and their behavior still remains medieval. After originating in the Arab desert, this barbaric anti-humanity cult spread outwards, destroying societies and subjecting humanity to unspeakable atrocities. The highly spiritual Hindu civilization also fell after they conquered Afghanistan and Sindh. Right from the first attack by Mohammad bin Qasim on Sindh in 715 AD (to punish Raja Dahir for sheltering Mohammad’s kin!!), for next 1000 years, every Islamic invasion brought the kinds of horrors and sub-human behavior that betrayed all sense of human sanity and civility. Temples like the Somnath always remained special targets due to their opulence. Living on loot and ‘booty’, the invading savages could neither imagine such immense wealth in the primitive uncivilized societies where they came from, nor did they possess mental capacity to understand the subtle Hindu culture that made Indian society so rich and so peaceful. During the centuries of Islamic dark-age, Mohammadans destroyed countless Temples and every spiritual-educational center on their way. Holiest spiritual abodes on the planet in Ayodhya, Kashi and Mathura also witnessed their beastly conduct. Their crime scene in Ayodhya was cleared recently, but dark spots still remain in Kashi and Mathura.

Asian Muslims have largely maintained basic humanitarian conduct; they still preserve and respect their Hindu heritage while following imposed Islam after Islamic invasion in the past.

The Somnath Temple

One Of the 12 Jyotirlings, Somnath is located in Prabhas Patan near Veraval in the Saurashtra region in the West coast of Gujarat. The Temple is located in such a way that there is no landmass in a straight line between Somnath seashore until Antarctica, as mentioned by a Sanskrit inscription found on the Bāṇa stambha (literally, arrow pillar) erected on the sea-protection wall. It mentions that the pillar stands at a point on the Indian landmass that is the first point on land in the north of the South Pole at that particular longitude. According to ancient scriptures, the Somnath Temple was first built by Raja Somraj in gold in the Satyayug, then by Raavan in silver in Tretayug, in wood by Krishna in Dwaparyug, and finally in stone by Bhimdev Solanki in Kaliyug. Non Indians and non-Hindus may have to study ancient scriptures to understand this sentence. In 1026, the temple was looted by Mahmud Ghazni, who took away camel-loads of jewels and valuable wealth from here. Archaeological findings suggest it was rebuilt at least three times before this disgraceful plunder in 1026. Later on, it was destroyed three more times – twice by

the barbaric rulers of Delhi Sultanate, in 1297 and 1395. Then again by the fanatic Mughal ruler, Aurangzeb, who destroyed it in 1706, a year before his death.

6 Important Causes of the Defeat of the Rajputs by Muhammad Ghori

The people of India made intensive efforts to stem the rising power of Islam for a long time in its north-west frontier. The invasion of the Arabs remained confined only to Sindh and Multan but by the time the Turks started invading Indian Territory, the defenses in the north-west had collapsed. Although attempts were made by the Hindus to defend their country, they failed disastrously against the foreign invaders, the Turks. Historians are divided on the issue of the reasons of the defeat of the Rajputs. Moreover, the contemporary chroniclers have not highlighted the causes of defeat of the Rajputs, hence the scholars of modern times have expressed their views of their own accord. It is really surprising that the Rajputs, who were brave fighters and competent warriors, were defeated by a handful of Muslim foreign invaders. Habibullah affirms that the Rajputs surpassed the Turks in individual fighting's. Even the enemies of the Rajputs have praised their bravery; therefore, their defeat seems to be very surprising. But if we read between the lines, it would not be difficult for us to understand the reasons of the defeat of the Rajputs against the Turks. The causes of defeat of the Rajputs can be classified as under:

1. Political Reason:

The political condition of India was quite deplorable before the invasion of the Muslims. India was divided into several small principalities after the death of Harsha and various clans of Rajputs ruled over them. There was no unity among them. They had often invited the foreign invader to crush their neighbour and supported him against his Indian antagonist. Thus, the lack of political unity in the country was the main reason for the downfall of the Rajputs. "Each prince had to fight single-handed and he fought for his own kingdom and territory as it was, and not for his country and people. Even in the moments of our greatest crisis, our rulers did not combine to put up a united defence against the invader." There was lack of national feeling among the Rajput lers. The Rajputs were very proud of their clan and always thought of its safety. No doubt, they faced the foreign invader with all their might but they did not pay attention to the invasions made on the other parts of India. They never thought of facing the common enemy jointly. Hence lack of strong central power also contributed to their decline. It harmed the Rajputs greatly.

2. Military Reasons:

The military organization of the Rajputs was very defective. The Rajputs did not maintain a permanent army for the safety of their country. The king had to depend on the armies of the feudal lords. Often they used to send to the battlefield untrained soldiers whom they had recruited hurriedly at the time of war. They were not imbued with a sense of patriotism. The Indian army was a crowd of infantry which lacked in training and equipment. They did not stand before the cavalry of the Muslims. "Mobility was the keynote of Turkish military organization at this time. It was the 'age of horse' and a well-equipped cavalry with tremendous mobility was the great need of the time. "Our army organization was based on outworn conception. They were ill-organized and ill-equipped. Our military leaders did not keep themselves in touch with the development of tactics." The Rajputs were ignorant of war tactics. They did not maintain a reserve army whereas Ghori also made use of his reserve arm when he found that the Hindu army was tired due to full day's conflict and attained victory over the exhausted soldiers. "Hindu kings, though fully equal to their assailant's courage and contempt of death, were distinctly inferior in the art of war and for that reason lost their independence." Muslim soldiers but they had to face defeats due to their own faults. Dr. Habibullah has pointed out that there was one chief defect in the military system of the Rajputs.

3. Social Reasons:

The social condition of India was equally a contributing factor for the defeat of the Rajputs besides political and military reasons. The Hindu society was disintegrating and plagued by several vices. There was a great caste and class struggle in the Hindu society and the caste system had become quite complicated. Inter-caste marriages, inter-dining and change of caste were not possible during this time. The untouchables were treated badly and forced to live outside the confines of the city. "The caste system created artificial barriers which prevented the unification of the various groups even for purposes of common defence and safety." Several evils emerged in Indian society due to social complexities. Child marriage, polygamy, sati system, female infanticide, devadasi system and other such evils were eating into the vitals of the society like white ants and Indian society was falling prey to superstitions and narrow fatalistic tendencies. It was not expected of such a society to be able to face the foreign invaders. Dr. R. C. Majumdar has written, "No public upheaval greets the foreigners, nor are any organized efforts made to stop their progress. Like a paralysed body, the Indian people helplessly look on, while the conquerors march on their

corpses.”Whereas the Muslim society was free from all such vices, they did not have caste or class problems.

4. Religious Reasons:

The religious system of India also contributed to the downfall of the Rajputs whereas the religious zeal of the Muslims helped them in getting victory against the Rajputs. Comparatively, Islam was a new religion and its followers were fired by enthusiasm. Expansion of Islam, destruction of ‘infidels’, their idols and temples was the motto of the Muslims. They declared their wars as ‘Jihad’ against the Hindus; they had firm faith that people got favour of God in expansion of Islam and in waging war against the ‘infidels’. Even if they died in this battle, they would attain Heaven and in case of victory they would be able to plunder the rich cities of India. Hence they fought against India with a missionary zeal. The theory of non-violence had still not lost ground in Indian society and they were not very eager to wage wars with such vigour as their antagonists used to do. It resulted in the defeat of the Rajputs at the hands of the Muslims.

5. Economic Reasons:

The Rajput rulers loved luxuries’. They used to spend lot money on their requirements and were also involved in mutual conflicts. Owing to this, not only the number of soldiers was decreasing rapidly but the treasury of the king was being emptied day after day. Shortage of wealth also affected the trade and agriculture of the country. But it does not mean that there was shortage of wealth in country. Actually, the gold of India was the chief reason of foreign invasions. It was stored in temples and religious places and was blocked to circulation. The foreigners plundered this wealth and enhanced their resources. It also increased their enthusiasm where the emptying of the royal treasuries forced the Rajputs to bow down before the foreign invaders. Thus, economic weakness of the Rajputs was also a significant reason of their defeat.

6. Other Reasons:

“Mere physical strength and military weapons do not constitute the total equipment of an army, inspiring ideology is as essential as military training and equipment. The Indian society was caste-ridden, fatalist and had firm faith in non-violence. Their narrow-mindedness due to superstitions harmed them greatly. “Superstition acted like double-edged sword towards the fall of Hindu India. While the Muslims believed that victory was bound to come to them, the Hindus believed

that they were bound to be conquered by the Muslims in Kaliyyuga. Such a superstition demoralized and discouraged the Hindus.”The Hindu Shahi kings like Jaipal and Anandpal committed suicide as they were defeated by the Muslims and they thought to themselves that they would never be able to attain victory against their enemies, whereas Ghoris made extensive preparations after his defeat in the first battle of Tarain and defeated his enemies in the second battle just after a year. Such way of thinking proved harmful for the Rajputs. “In truth, it was not for their social and geographical aloofness but for want of leaders with sufficient talents that the Indians of the eleventh and twelfth centuries failed to adopt their time-honoured system of warfare (as Shivaji, the Maratha, was destined to do in the seventeenth century) to the requirement of the new situation. accepted by other historians because there is no justification in the theory that a meat-eater is more powerful in comparison to the vegetarian. Besides all the reasons referred to above, the rotten political situation of India was chiefly responsible for the defeat of the Rajputs against the Muslims.

UNIT-IV

TOPIC-2

Causes of the Downfall of Early Medieval Rulers in India

A famous quote is justified on the situation prevailed during the Early Medieval Rulers in India i.e. “Fruit is never destroyed by the gametes outside but inside”. This is what happens in India during early medieval period because majority of ruling dynasties were from Rajput clan who were known for their valour, bravery and strength. But what were the reasons; they were defeated by the ordinary invaders. After analysis of Early Medieval Indian History, it shows that they were defeated due to their own lapses which are discussed below:

1. Lack of United Common Front

The early Medieval India was disintegrated into numerous ruling dynasties and they never goes for united common front. In fact, they fought for their own selfish ends and honour of their own family without having notion of country or nation. They ruled for their own pride and feeling of mutual enmity. Hence, lack of unity was the first important reasons for the downfall of early medieval ruling dynasties.

2. Military Weakness.

The Early Medieval India was feudal in character because the ruling kings never mainList of Provincial Kingdoms before and after the Sultanate period

3. Lack of new arms and defensive war strategy

The early medieval ruling dynasties were not equipped with art of warfare and strategy for the foreign aggressors. They themselves never tried to learn new strategies of war. Spear and sword were their weapons which were not suitable to strike from distance whereas the Turkish invaders were fine archers who depended primarily on the use of efficient and well-disciplined cavalry.

4. Weak Espionage System

Espionage is the practice of obtaining confidential information through spying; a practice that often employs covert, clandestine, illegal or unethical behaviour. Spies have been used to create political, military, and economic advantage through most of history.

The espionage system in early medieval India was not good or we can say limited because the ruling dynasties of early medieval India were limited, to keep a watch over the movement of their neighbouring ruling dynasties. They never pay attention to the foreigner's movements. The invaders spies enter into the states of early medieval ruling states 'with message of mutual jealousies, rivalries and internal dissensions. They win over local chiefs by offering them money and land. Thus, foreign aggressors took political mileage of the internal disunity.

Foreign Travellers of Medieval Period

5. Negligence of Frontier Security

The rulers of the early medieval India never work on the maintenance and safeguard of the frontiers because all invasions of India occurred from the side of north-west frontiers. Even knowing this fact of history, rulers of the north-west frontiers neglected the watch on the frontiers. For Example- If Prithvi Raj Chauhan concentrated on the maintenance of the frontier, Mohammad Gore could not enter the city of Thanesar in 11th and 12th century AD. It would have been impossible for him to enter into India.

6. The Elephantry

The army of early medieval ruling states consisted of Elephantry in the first line. When these elephants get hurt by an arrow in the Warfield, returned back to the Warfield trampling their own infantry. Whereas Turkish depend upon Cavalry, which was equipped with speed and controllable. The elephants move quite slowly and horses move fast. This was one of the driving components of defeat.

7. Lack of Diplomacy, and full of Morality and Ethics

The rulers of early medieval India observed morality and ethics not only in general life but also in the Warfield. They never attack at night on the sleeping enemy as well as to the unarmed people. The Turkish did not believe in such values. For conquest, Turks did not differentiate between moral and immoral. For instance- If

Prithvi Raj Chauhan could have imprisoned Mohammad Ghori in the first battle of Tarain, the second battle of Tarrain would not happen. As a result, Mohammad Ghori broke his promises and defeated Prithvi Raj Chauhan.

8. Lack of unity in Castes

The Early Medieval rulers were filled with the feeling of caste superiority and they considered other castes as inferior. They never mingle and dine with other castes which bring disunity among the people. They believe that Kshatriyas can only fight and entitled to choose warfare as a profession. Whereas, the Turks had no such feelings, they lived together and fight together.

UNIT-IV

TOPIC-2

13th century Sultan of Delhi Alauddin Khilji, it's time for a reckoning not only in how we see Khilji, but historical figures in general.

Many historians and media outlets have leapt into opposition against director Sanjay Leela Bhansali's (and actor Ranveer Singh's) depiction, accurately pointing out that the real Khilji was highly influenced by Persian culture, that he used cruelty as a strategy and that he kept the Mongols out of India.

These are excellent points and one wonders if the Padmaavat depiction will contribute to a negative stereotype about India's Islamic rulers (even though the film focuses on the ruler's obsession over a woman rather than on his administrative skills).

However, this debate has distracted us from a comprehensive assessment of Khilji's policies and achievements by focusing on one set of conflicts in North India.

The most long-reaching effects of Khilji's career were not merely military or territorial, though those were important. His policies also played an important and decisive role in India's economic and political history, especially so in the south.

Cruelty and conquest

The shockingly rapid progress of Turkic and then Mongol hordes through the world from roughly the 10th century begs the question of why they were so successful in the first place. Their meritocratic, well-drilled and highly mobile cavalry armies crushed larger forces from China to Hungary and India. However, their true talent lay in psychological warfare.

Jack Weatherford in *Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World* points out that the Mongol Khan always offered cities the option of surrender before ordering their complete destruction. Often, the brutal levelling of one city and the massacre of its ruling elite would lead to the rapid surrender of its neighbours to Mongol rule, thus saving on manpower. In the case of both the Turks and the Mongols, it took barely a generation to go from “barbaric” conquerors to rulers.

This is a marked departure from earlier tribal confederacies such as the Huns and Vandals, but closer to the Kushans and Parthians. They would adopt local cultural practices, spread technology, enable trade and not interfere too much in the religious practices of their new subjects.

The Turks differed in the last because they had already converted to Islam, but rulers like Alauddin Khilji were nevertheless more pragmatic than we generally think (Khilji, as attested to by Ziauddin Barani—a 13-14th century chronicler in the Delhi Sultanate—was one of the rare sultans who dared skip the Friday prayer). In one of history’s strange twists, by the 13th century, the once-nomadic Turks had to face the recently nomadic Mongols.

It is in this context that we should see Alauddin Khilji. He is a Machiavellian (dare we say Kautilyan?) figure. In fact, Khilji’s ruthless adherence to the principle that the state must benefit at all costs, while being agnostic to religion, is strikingly similar to the views of the Arthashastra.

As a young man, he led a lightning raid into the wealthy fort of Devagiri, supposedly capturing the raja while he was at dinner and holding him hostage until a ransom was paid and a marital alliance concluded. The funds thus accumulated were used to assassinate his uncle and place himself on the throne.

As sultan, Khilji needed to defend his frontiers from Mongol incursions while simultaneously fending off assertive vassals and independent Indian states. The Indian powers were terrorized into submission through a ruthless application of psychological warfare, as Khilji’s actions against the Rajputs proved. But to keep this up, he would need a large standing army, not a traditional feudal levy to be raised only when in danger.

In an almost Ciceronian bent of mind, he seems to have recognised that the sinews of war were infinite money, in addition to Mongol-style psychological attacks. Using the territory of his compulsory ally, Devagiri, he dispatched a series of raiding

expeditions south under his general Malik Kafur, while terrorizing the Mongols, building their severed heads into the foundations of Siri Fort in Delhi .

Kafur, too, used shock-and-awe tactics. The infantry and elephant-focussed armies of the south were outmanoeuvred, supply lines severed, and smashed separately before they could converge. The rougher terrain of the Deccan gave them some edge against cavalry (which does best on flat terrain a la North India), but the Turkic officer core and army organisation, perfected in the fluid, mobile battlefields of Central Asia, were a class apart. As a result, kingdoms such as the Hoysalas and the Kakatiyas tried to buy time with ransoms but were ultimately defeated.

Khilji's campaigns completely upset the South Indian status quo. The dynasties which he had uprooted adhered to an older form of kingship, a sort of segmentary sovereignty which compelled the ruler to recognize the hereditary rights of interest groups such as village councils, landed nobility, and merchant guilds.

But recent scholarship, especially work done by Burton Stein, points to a broader trend of migration of hardy warrior-peasants (especially from Andhra) into the rocky Deccan that was already in place, creating new urban centres which threatened the older landed order . By shattering this older order, he cleared the way for the creation of new states, the emergence of new interest groups, and therefore new social and political equilibria.

The turmoil which he caused opened up military and administrative careers to castes that would otherwise have been excluded. It might not have been intended, but it is no less real or significant.

The South Indian states of the 13th century onward were more integrated into the global economy and the latest technological and military advances. The Bahmani Sultanate and the Vijayanagara Empire learnt well from the campaigns of Alauddin. Trade was a major priority for Vijayanagara, and control of the ports of Tamilakam and the Konkan Coast was deemed important enough to call halts to civil wars . Sovereigns took care to import the best cavalry from the Arabs and gunpowder weapons from the Portuguese, and recruit Turkic officers. Armies (in the initial period) were relatively meritocratic and many, including the family of the famous ruler Krishna Deva Raya, rose to prominence through military service.

Other groups of cultivators-turned-rulers, such as the Reddys, remain prominent to this day, and the migratory movements which could happen due to the anarchy of the 13th century left a significant imprint on the demographic profile of South India.

A wonder of the world?

Khilji, however, was not interested in setting up shop in the turbulent and distant south. His primary concern would remain the Mongol incursions and maintaining his grip on his North Indian territory.

Booty from raids was generously spread among his supporters, increasing the money supply and causing skyrocketing inflation. This could be one of the reasons for the implementation of his infamous system of price controls. Another could be the expense of maintaining a large standing army, which, like in most empires, necessitated a vicious cycle of more conquest to fuel an even larger army.

The sultan's price control department wasn't just an organization full of harmless bureaucrats with misplaced incentives (our modern equivalent perhaps is). The Diwan-e-Riyasat started by keeping essential commodity prices low for soldiers (so Khilji could pay them less) and soon expanded to every item in Delhi's markets, from camels to cloth.

But these price controls inevitably led to black market trading as a new equilibrium was reached between buyers and sellers. In addition, famines inevitably led to hoarding and shortages.

To deal with this, an intricate spy network ensured that any violations to the system were reported and dealt with. In times of scarcity, the entire city of Delhi was put on rations and fed only from government granaries, which acquired grain at fixed prices. Barani informs us that any merchant who was found cheating the standard rates was penalised by cutting off an equal weight of flesh from his limbs. Still standing in the heart of South Delhi, functioning as roundabout for traffic, is Khilji's Chor Minar. This was used to display the heads of thieves or dacoits who tried to defraud the system.

These are further examples of the sultan's willingness to use calculated, deterring cruelty to further what he saw as the interests of the state, and again an eerie echo of the Arthashastra.

Within a few years of Alauddin's accession, Delhi became unrecognizable. Practically a surveillance state where the Big Sultan knew all, its markets boasted possibly the most elaborate system of price controls ever conceived, at relatively cheap prices compared to global standards.

In times of famine, amazingly, every household in the city had something to eat, enabled by a sophisticated system of godowns and warehouses. Contemporary travellers' accounts describe the fixed prices, come hell or high water, as a wonder of the world. The system allowed Alauddin to maintain, arguably, the largest, best equipped force ever fielded by the Delhi Sultanate, with observable results. But the policy had other ramifications.

The peasantry and landed nobility had little incentive to increase production, struggling under heavy tax burdens. The sultan refused to lower the taxes they paid, and his land surveys—the first in the history of the Sultanate—allowed him to keep a keen eye on defaulters, and tax cultivators directly. Merchants, too, could not pursue profits beyond what the sultan allowed (a departure from Kautilya, who has more farsighted views on fair prices and profiteering).

Irfan Habib points out in *Cambridge Economic History Of India Vol-1* that real wages for labourers remained low, and Khilji often had to subsidise merchants, though Abraham Eraly argues that the improved functioning of state institutions could have allowed for some degree of prosperity.

While prices were kept constant in Delhi and nearby markets, they kept increasing as per the free market in other parts of the world, creating excellent arbitrage opportunities for traders who were willing to take the risk of getting their heads chopped off.

Gujarati textile merchants made full use of this opportunity, buying cheap cloth from Delhi and selling it at places like Mecca for a delicious 700% profit. Coastal trade grew leaps and bounds, with wealth essentially being transferred from the once-dominant urban centre of Delhi to new ones on the coast. These new centres came at a point when the fledgling empires of the Deccan were rising, and would have played a vital role in integrating India into global maritime trade, which was rapidly expanding. This is an important effect, which most Delhi-centric views of Khilji's rule neglect.

Ultimately, it is difficult to say whether Khilji was a savior or a villain. But that is the point of looking critically at our past—nobody can fit into a single category.

UNIT-IV

TOPIC-3

First Battle of Panipat (1526)

BACKGROUND

Panipat has been described as the pivot of Indian history for 300 years. And its story begins in the first great battle of 1526. After the fall of the Sayyids, the Afghan Lodi dynasty had seized power at Delhi. The power of the sultanate had decreased considerably at this time, though the sultan could still command significant resources. Ibrahim Lodi, the third ruler, was unpopular with the nobility for his persecution and execution of a large number of old nobles. A prominent noble, Daulat Khan, fearing for his life, appealed to Zahir-ud-din Babur, the Timurid ruler of Kabul, to come and depose Ibrahim Lodi. It was thought that Babur would defeat Lodi, plunder, and leave. Babur, however, had different ideas.

Babur, a Timurid prince with descent from Timur and Chingiz Khan, had originally inherited the kingdom of Fergana — one of the breakaway regions in the aftermath of the breakup of the once mighty Timurid empire. The two foremost powers in the region at this time were the Safavids of Iran and the Uzbeks of Central Asia. Squeezed between them, Babur had to fight for survival. Gaining and losing Samarkand 3 times, he eventually moved to Kabul in 1504, where he aimed to consolidate a power base. It was here that he came into touch with India and between 1504 and 1524 had raided across the Northwestern frontier 4 times. His main goal at this time was to consolidate

his position in Afghanistan by crushing the rebellious pathan tribes of the region, particularly the Yusufzais. Having given up his aspirations of retaking Samarkand in 1512 he now dreamed of a new empire east of the Indus, and bided his time for an opportunity. In the Baburnama he writes that as these territories were once conquered by Timurlane he felt it was his natural birthright and he resolved to acquire them by force if necessary. The invitation of the Afghan chiefs provided him with this opportunity.

BABUR'S INVASION :

Babur started for Lahore, Punjab, in 1524 but found that Daulat Khan Lodi had been driven out by forces sent by Ibrahim Lodi. When Babur arrived at Lahore, the Lodi army marched out and was routed. Babur burned Lahore for two days, then marched to Dipalpur, placing Alam Khan, another rebel uncle of Lodi's, as governor. There after he returned to Kabul to gather reinforcements. Alam Khan was quickly overthrown and fled to Kabul. In response, Babur supplied Alam Khan with troops who later joined up with Daulat Khan and together with about 30,000 troops, they besieged Ibrahim Lodi at Delhi. He defeated them and drove off Alam's army, Babur realized Lodi would not allow him to occupy Punjab. Meanwhile Alam also demanded Babur assign Delhi to him after its capture, which was not acceptable to Babur. In 1525 November, Babur set out in force to seize the empire he sought. Crossing the Indus a census of the army revealed his core fighting force numbering 12,000. This number would grow as it joined his garrison in Punjab and some local allies or mercenaries to around 20,000 at Panipat. Entering Sialkot unopposed he moved on to Ambala. His intelligence alerted him that Hamid Khan was about to reinforce Lodi's force with a contingent, he sent his son Humayun to defeat his detachment at Hisar Firoza. From Ambala the army moved south to Shahabad, then east to reach the River Jumna opposite Sarsawa. At the same time Ibrahim Lodi, Sultan of Delhi, had gathered his army and was advancing slowly north from Delhi, eventually camping somewhere

close to Panipat. Late in March 1526 Ibrahim decided to send a small force across the Yamuna into the Doab (the area between the Yamuna and the Ganges). Babur learnt of this when he was two days south of Sarsawa, and decided to send a raiding force across the river to attack this detachment. His right wing had won the victory on 26 February, and so this time he detached his left wing, once again reinforced with part of the centre, so the two armies may have been about the same size. Babur's men crossed the Jumna at midday on 1 April, and advanced south during the afternoon. At day-break on 2 April Babur's men reached the enemy camp. Daud Khan and Hatim Khan would appear to have been caught by surprise and attacked before they could form their men up into a proper line. Babur's men quickly broke their resistance, and chased Ibrahim's men until they were opposite Ibrahim's main camp. Hatim Khan was one of 60–70 prisoners captured, along with 6 or 7 elephants. Just as after the battle on 26 February most of the prisoners were executed, again to send a warning to Ibrahim's men.

After this victory Babur continued to advance south, reaching Panipat on 12 April. Here Babur received news of the apparent huge size of Lodi's army and began to take defensive measures. He was confident in his troops, the core of which were battle-hardened veterans, loyal friends to him through thick and thin. He also enjoyed a solid rapport with his men and treated them on an equal footing. Any could dine at his table. Ibrahim Lodi however was facing dissension in ranks. He even had to resort to distributing riches to encourage his troops and promised more. Personally brave, Ibrahim was an inexperienced commander and quite vain which upset some of the Afghan nobility. For eight days both armies stood facing each other without making a decisive move. Finally Babur in an attempt to goad Lodi into attacking him ordered a night raid by 5000 picked horsemen. However the attack faltered badly, and the Mughals narrowly escaped. Elated by his success, Lodi now advanced to meet Babur's forces on the fields of Panipat.

THE AFGHAN SULTANATE ARMY :

The Delhi sultanate armies had traditionally been based around cavalry. To this the addition was made of the Indian war elephant. The Elephant and horse formed the 2 pillars of sultanate military strength. The army would be based on a quasi-feudal structure. A small central force under the Sultan's direct control at Delhi supplemented by large number of contingents brought by the different afghan chiefs or Jagirdars, plus Jagirdars (turkish) and indian feudal levies and mercenaries (largely infantry). There was no gunpowder artillery and infantry was very much a cannon-fodder force. Ibrahim Lodi was at this time involved in attempts at centralization which was unpopular amongst his chieftains. Ibrahim Lodi's army at Panipat may be estimated at 50,000 men and 400 war elephants. Perhaps 25,000 of these were heavy cavalry predominantly afghan, rest being feudal levies or mercenaries of less value.

Heavy Cavalry

The afghans were not a steppe people and thus didn't master horse archery. Rather they relied on heavy shock cavalry as the basis of their military power. Above shows the equipment of an afghan mailed heavy lancer. To the left is one wearing the standard plate-chainmail hybrid armour of the day. To the right is iron lamellar armour. Both would have been in use, though mail would have predominated. The second picture depicts a typical afghan mailed lancer in action. They were a redoubtable foe and under Sher shah proved could easily turn the tables on the mughals.

Ghulam Armoured cavalry, standard melee cavalry of the delhi sultanate since the time of the ghurids. These would have changed little since the early days of the sultanate except perhaps in armour. Even though the turks were no longer in power at

delhi,most jagirdars would be bringing cavalry of similar type.Armed with Shield,lance,Mace and scimitar.

A terrifying shock weapon as well as mobile fortress,used properly they were a formidable problem.They mounted a mahout and 2–3 infantrymen with spears and bows. Against the earlier mongol invasions of the delhi sultanate under the khiljis,the combination of armoured elephants and Sultanate cavalry had proved too much even for the mongols. However this descendant of genghis had something-that the earlier chagatai mongols didn't have — *Cannons*.

SULTANATE INFANTRY

India's humid climate,the impact of archery and the dominating presence of war elephants didn't allow the development of heavily armoured infantry or pikemen in packed formations as in europe. Infantry were very much cannon fodder. Lodi's army would have consisted of several types of infantry,infantry itself being held in low regard during his period.

1. The afghan chiefs would have brought with them along with their mounted retainers, Pashtun tribal foot infantrymen armed with an assortment of weapons including axes,swords and spears.May or may not be armoured according to wealth.
2. Muslim foot archers armed with the composite bow and a sword.(seen above left)
3. Bumi feudal levies conscripted by the local zamindars/chieftains making up the numbers.Generally no armour,a traditional bamboo longbow(inferior than the composite bow but more durable and easier to obtain) and a broadsword.Mercenaries might have armour.

AFGHAN TACTICS :

The battle formation consisted of the traditional five-fold divisions — the vanguard, the right, the left, the centre and the rear. Sultan stood at the centre with a picked body of cavalry. Skirmishing and night raids were common. The Afghans based their battle tactics around the shock strike forces of their elephants and heavy cavalry. Brute force in massed frontal assaults on the flat plains were therefore key elements of Ibrahim lodi's plan. A considerable part of this army was feudal contingents from the various nobles, they were thus not drilled nor trained to work in co-operation with the whole body, and suffered from lack of maneuverability. They were however well equipped and courageous, if lacking the discipline of the veteran baburids. They also had no understanding of the Tulughma tactics of Central Asia.

THE MUGHUL ARMY :

Babur's army consisted of turks, mongols, iranians and afghans. It was built as a veteran core which had been campaigning alongside him for over a decade and thus the troops and commanders were confident, and familiar with each other. It also had an element of equality where any trooper could dine with babur or give his opinion on tactics in contrast with the tiered hierarchy in the sultanate army. And they were campaigning far away from home, where defeat would mean annihilation with nowhere to retreat. All these factors contributed to better morale. The army was organized along timurid lines - units of 10, 50, 100, 500, 1000. Babur's army at Panipat numbered 15,000–20,000 men. The bulk of them timurid cavalry, supplemented by turkish gunners with gunpowder matchlocks and cannons - till now an unknown feature on the indian battlefield.

CAVALRY

Cavalry was the centerpiece of the mughul army. Babur's horsemen would have been composed of Horse archers — mainly mongols recruited from moghulistan in central asia and masters of steppe warfare and also turks and heavy melee cavalry(who may also use bows).Even the horsearchers in the mughul army wore full armor. Lamellar armour was in extensive use alongside chainmail-plate hybrid armours.(so called 'mirror' armor).First picture on top shows baburid shock cavalry using lances ,swords.They usually wear mailshirts beneath a padded jacket on top.On the right is a light horseman with scimitar.Second picture above shows a cavalryman in lamellar armour and lance on the left,he is fully capable of acting as a horse archer.On the right is pure heavy cavalryman in mail armour(mail more suited to close combat)with straight sword and battle-axe.A product of steppe warfare,horse archers were the primary cause of the superiority of nomadic armies in the age of cavalry and among the most effective troop types in military history.Though the afghans had excellent horsemen as well,they relied on heavy mailed cavalry over mounted archers.They were masters of ambushes, raiding, feigned retreats. The deadliest mughul weapon was the Turco-Mongol Composite bow. Generally capable of shooting 3 times faster than a matchlock it was in the hands of a veteran horse archers possible to launch volleys of 6 shots in 20 seconds.It was accurate upto 70–100 yards and still dangerous upto 200 yards. Babur employed his horse archers to the flanks and in front of his army as a screen.

At the back -Timurid Horse archer on his mount.Standing in front is a Turkish '*Turkhaan*' or hero-an elite Mounted trooper in full body armour and faceplate -usually a member of the commander's bodyguard or a captain of a unit.In front is an elite infantryman of the guard (*Shamshirbaaz*) with sword,shield and bow. Babur's cavalry was battle-hardened and well-drilled.

INFANTRY

Babur's infantry was of 2 main types. Footarchers armed with composite bows and a secondary weapon and more importantly Matchlock musketeers. Ratio of archers to matchlockmen was 4:1. Both weapons had about the same effective range of 100 yds. But bowmen had almost 3 times the rate of fire while matchlocks had unparalleled armour penetration and lethality, capable of stopping a horse or even an elephant dead in its tracks. Matchlock musketeers were called *Tufang* or *Bunduqchi* and used a protective mantlet as cover when firing the weapon. Matchlockmen in Babur's service were mostly Turkish origin.

Gunpowder weapons were introduced in central Asia by the Mongols who brought them from China, but these were very rudimentary mainly siege devices. The Ottomans developed gunpowder weapons quite early along with the Europeans. In the first decades of the 16th century the newly equipped Ottoman gunpowder armies inflicted stunning defeats on their Safavid rivals who in a crash programme equipped themselves with similar weapons. Babur who was in intimate contact with Safavid military developments at this time possibly acquired these weapons in the same manner.

ARTILLERY :

Babur began a new epoch in Indian military history with the introduction of field artillery which he would use to devastating impact. Four the basic models were used by Babur — the *zarb-zan*, (light cannon), *kazan*, (heavy cannon), *kazan-i-bozorg* (siege gun) and *firingi* (swivel/anti-personnel gun) with only the first 2 types present at Panipat. Babur's artillery used only stone shot. Stone was cheap and plentiful, but the production of stone cannon balls was extremely labor intensive. Metal was more expensive, but metal shot was much easier to make. Stone projectiles were not as dense as metal and transferred less energy to the target, but they might also shatter on impact, producing lethal shrapnel as a secondary effect. Metal ammunition did have

one very important advantage — it could be made hollow. When left empty such projectiles were lighter and could travel further. When loaded with gunpowder, they could be fused to explode on impact. They were not horse drawn but rather mounted on carriages. Babur had 20 cannons at Panipat.

MUGHUL TACTICS:

Babur's tactics at Panipat showed the influence of a mix of 2 military traditions — The Ottoman and the Mongol-timurid. The use of wagon carts as battlefield defenses was first pioneered by the Hussite rebels of Europe under Jan Zizka, though the Hungarians it was transmitted to the Ottomans who made it the centrepiece of their tactical system — *The Tabur Cengi* (camp battle). Even previously the Ottomans employed infantry in the centre behind natural defenses to act as a pivot flanked by mobile cavalry wings, an advance guard and a reserve to the rear as demonstrated at Nicopolis. The adoption of the cart-wagon line allowed them to create artificial defenses for their infantry now. These tactics were used to devastating effect vs the Safavids in 1514 and against the Hungarians at Mohacs in 1526. It was through his Turkish gunners that Babur came to be acquainted with this system of battle.

Below - On top the Ottoman *Tabur cengi*. Boxes with Diagonal shades - Cavalry. Cross shades - Infantry. Light colour indicates light cavalry or infantry. *Akinci* light cavalry screens Ottoman center deployment, skirmishes the enemy and draws him into attacking the Ottoman centre through harassment and feigned retreats. Infantry and artillery in the centre behind wagon ladder defenses. Irregular *Azap* infantry on the flanks and Janissaries with muskets in the centre, cannons spread over the wagon line. *Sipahis* on both wings. These will conduct the main mobile battle looking to outflank the enemy and push him inwards in front of the *Janissaries* and cannons where they can be mowed down. Generally a reserve of more *Sipahis* to the rear on each wing. Finally the Sultan with his personal household troops - The *Kapikulu* *Sipahis* and a chosen infantry

bodyguard as a last reserve. The use of carts in battle is also called *Araba*. The *tulughma* implied dividing a smaller force into subordinate divisions within the traditional divisions for better maneuverability and flexibility. The highly mobile right and left divisions peeled out and surrounded the larger enemy force, especially through employment of flanking parties. The standard Central Asian battle array, or *yasal*, was divided into four basic parts — the *irawul* (*Harawal*) or vanguard, the *ghol* (*Kol*) or center, the *chadavul* or rear guard, and the *jaranghar* and *baranghar* — the left and right flanks. During the early expansion of the Turkic and Mongol empires these units were composed almost exclusively of cavalry, but as these states and their rulers became increasingly sedentary, larger numbers of infantry began to appear.

The vanguard was composed primarily of light cavalry and light infantry. It was responsible for scouting and skirmishing. The vanguard acted essentially as a shock absorber for the center, using skirmishing tactics and missile fire to slow and disrupt a frontal assault by enemy heavy cavalry, infantry or elephants. When hard pressed they gradually gave ground and fell back to merge with the main force. Against less aggressive enemies they were tasked with staging harassing attacks followed by feigned retreats designed to lure the opponent into contact with the center and to make them vulnerable to overexertion and flanking maneuvers. The center was the largest component and included the commander's headquarters and bodyguard. It could in conjunction with the vanguard withstand a frontal assault, fixing the enemy in place for envelopment from the flanks. It was also capable of delivering shock action, either as a first strike or on the counterattack. The rear guard was smaller and could act as a reserve but generally protected the baggage. The flanking units had the most specialized and demanding task. They were responsible for carrying out the *tulughmeh*, or encircling maneuver (This term was also used to describe the contingents of soldiers responsible for carrying out that tactic). These groups were comprised exclusively of well trained light cavalry, especially horse archers. Their job was to race around the opposing army's flanks and towards its rear as it was engaged with the main

force. When an army approached an enemy that was stationary or falling back, the flank units often pulled well ahead of the main body as they began their encircling maneuver, so that the entire formation changed its shape to resemble a crescent with the points facing forward. When on the defensive they might initially pull back, “refusing” the flanks and creating an arc facing in the opposite direction. Babur learned the intricacies of this technique in his battles with the Uzbeks. He writes in the *Baburnama* -

“In battle the great reliance of the Uzbeks is on the tulughmeh. They never engage without using the tulughmeh.” — Babur

As tactics became more sophisticated particularly under Timur the larger units were broken down into sub groups which could operate independently. In the picture the standard mughul *tulughma* formation is shown with *qarawal* scouts screening, a vanguard, right wing and left wing composed of infantry in front and cavalry to the rear. *Illtimish* Reserves behind each flank. The tulughma flanking parties on the extreme ends. The centre or *Kol* is divided into 3 divisions - The reserve composing the commander's bodyguard, The centre right division and the centre left division. Rearguard protects camp. Both the *jaranghar* and *Baranghar* wings try to outflank their opposing flank while the tulughma parties carry out a wide envelopment, centre and vanguard act as a pinning force that can also counterattack frontally. The *illtimish* reserves behind each flank can reinforce their respective wings or join the flanking movements. Similarly the left centre and right centre can reinforce the wings or take up positions vacated by the wings cavalry while they are carrying out the wheeling movements against the enemy's flanks. Babur drilled his cavalry regularly to carry out the complex manoeuvres.

The fusion of these 2 similar tactical systems would be employed by Babur at Panipat.

THE BATTLE OF PANIPAT

To avoid being outflanked by the large afghan army, Babur anchored his right flank close to the walls of the city of Panipat, while his left flank was protected by a ditch strengthened with a wooden stockade to prevent cavalry movement. In the centre he had a line of 700 ox-carts tied together with rawhide ropes to break up any charge. At intervals of 100 to 200 yards there were intervals with passages for cavalry to sally out and attack. These passages were heavily defended with archers and matchlock-men and were possibly closed with chains (chains being lowered when cavalry sallied out). Behind this protective barrier Babur sited his guns. Between every 2 guns, 5–6 protective mantlets behind which matchlock-men were deployed. Screening these preparations was the *Qarawal* light cavalry scouts deployed up front. Behind the infantry and artillery on the cart-line the main body of cavalry was deployed in the standard mughul battle array divided into vanguard, left wing and right wing. (*Initials used RW for right wing for eg.*). Plus the centre in 3 sub-divisions and the *illtimish* reserves. (*Illtimish = I, RC = Right centre, LC = Left Centre*). Rearguard protects the camp.

At the extreme sides are the *tulughma* flanking parties (FP). Babur deployed his half-wild Mongol horse archers in these contingents due to their mastery of steppe warfare. Babur's plan is to hold the afghan mass in front, and roll its wings onto the centre where the whole body would become a concentrated target for his matchlocks, archers and artillery and suffer devastating losses. Humayun leads the right flank, Chin Timur the vanguard and Sultan mirza the left flank. His ottoman gunner Ustad Ali Quli is in charge of the artillery. It is also he who shows Babur how to

employ the cart-line field fortifications. Lodi deploys his force in 4 divisions. Two flanks, a large vanguard and a centre containing much of the inferior infantry. He places himself at the very centre of the battle line with a body of 5000 picked mailed lancers. In front of his army stands the massive phalanx of 400 armoured war elephants.

1. As the Afghan War elephants move up, they are greeted by the utterly unfamiliar noise of Mughul cannons which terrifies them and they refuse to advance further.

2. The Afghan Vanguard clashes with the horse archer screen and sweeps it away, sensing success- the Pathans surge forward. The vanguard of the Afghans has advanced too quickly, thus creating a gap with the centre which is still far away.

3. The light cavalry of the former Qarawal screen withdraw back through the passages and merge with the Mughul vanguard.

4. Lodi aims his attack where the Mughul right flank meets Panipat, and the Afghan right moves forward in columns to try and outflank the Mughal right. Babur observes the Afghan body inclined to its left advancing on his right flank and immediately reinforces the flank with its Illtimish mobile reserve.

1. As the leading elements of the Afghan left wing approaches the Mughul right, they are taken aback by the wagon line fortifications and hesitate on seeing the Mughals reinforcing their right flank. As a result the front ranks halt, throwing the rear ranks already in a cramped space into some disorder. The Tughma flanking parties now wheel and hit them with showers of arrows from the rear.

2. The centre of Lodi's vanguard is held up by the concentrated fire from the cart line as the Mughul cannons and matchlocks open fire, supported by archers and unable to advance due to the cart line-defenses. The noise and smoke terrifies the Afghans.

3. The elephants now under artillery attack and totally unnerved by the sound turn and trample back through the advancing rear ranks of the afghan army, disorganizing and demoralizing it.

4. The mughals begin their celebrated tulughma wheeling manuevre. The right flank reserves move to outflank the Pathan left wing. The afghans now get a taste of the real weapon of the mughals- the deadly turco-mongol composite bow. The afghan heavy cavalry is unable to cope with the mobile timurid horse archers.

5. Babur Piles on the pressure. He dispatches his right centre to join the assault on the afghan left wing. (See how each new reserve takes the place of the preceding formation, as that goes to flank the enemy as if turning a wheel) The afghan left wing is packed into a dense mass, due to the disorder caused by friction between front and rear ranks and becomes a massive target for concentrated mughul firepower from arrows, matchlocks and cannons. They take devastating losses.

6. Similarly on the afghan right wing, the mongol flanking parties bombard the pathans from the rear by wheeling in. Simultaneously the mughul left wing moves in and joins the fray, even as the mughal gunpowder weapons take a toll on the front.

7. Babur senses a growing panic in the afghan ranks, and orders his left centre and left mobile reserve to sally out through the gaps and join the assault on the afghan right wing.

1. Bombarded from all sides, unit cohesion breaks down in the sultanate forces- as the aggressively wheeling mughal flanks compress the afghans into a central mass- a perfect killzone for the mughul artillery and gunners.

2. See the mughul taulaghma wheeling manuevre complete on both sides,as the battalions have wheeled almost in synchronization and surrounded the afghan flanks.This exceptional performance was made possible in part by the drilling and combat experience of babur's cavalry.
3. Lodi makes a desperate charge,cutting down quite a few mughals before he is killed. This was perhaps a premature move as he still had many reserves left and babur had nearly none.
4. Lodi's death triggers general collapse and afghans rout.
5. The second line now disintegrate on hearing of lodi's demise.

Losses — Afghans suffered 15,000 killed or wounded.The mughuls 4,000

AFTERMATH :

Babur's victory led to the end of the delhi sultanate and the establishment of the Mughul dynasty which was to mark an epoch in the history of medieval india. Babur went on to deal with threats to his position at Khanua against the Rajputs and Gogra against the Afghans,but died before he could consolidate what he had conquered. His son humayun had to deal with a resurgent afghan threat under Sher Shah. The final consolidation of the Mughul Empire was left to Akbar,Babur's grandson.Militarily,the battle of panipat marks the beginning of the gunpowder age in earnest and the end of the age of elephants as the prime weapon of indian warfare.

CAUSES OF MUGHUL SUCCESS :

1. *Intelligence* — The difference in efficient intelligence had been apparent. Babur's espionage system allowed him to intercept reinforcements from hamid khan to lodi.

While Babur continuously probed the Afghans during the standoff, Ibrahim Lodi had not sufficiently prepared for the true nature of the Mughal defences and was surprised. His intelligence on Babur's army too seems to have been minimal as he gave no thought to the effect of cannons on elephants and made them a cornerstone of his tactics.

2. *Discipline* — Babur's army was by far more disciplined, being able to execute the complex wheeling manoeuvre flawlessly, while the Afghans were thrown into disorder by their own follies and also charged prematurely ahead of the centre.

3. *Morale* — Morale seems to have been high in Babur's camp. Babur treated his soldiers with an air of equality and the Mughals were in enemy territory with nowhere to run. Ibrahim Lodi's troops on the other hand, at least a part of them were discontent and the vanity of Lodi himself didn't help matters. The elephant havoc and Lodi's death were the last straw.

4. *Technology* - Babur's forces had the next generation of weapons technology available in form of cannons and matchlocks. While these were still primitive in form they rendered the elephants useless and gave Babur an edge.

5. *Firepower Dominance* - While the Afghans placed their faith on shock tactics, the Mughals enjoyed a total dominance throughout the battle in firepower. The artillery, matchlocks but above all, the turko-mongol composite bow shattered Afghan ranks with a ceaseless barrage. Firepower's effect is not only physical, but also psychological - as there is nothing worse to a soldier than to be fired at without being able to reply.

6. *Surprise* — Babur's unorthodox tactics. The use of the cart line and the artillery placement and the *Tulughma* flanking attacks, befuddled the Afghans. These were things not seen before in the subcontinent's battlefields.

7. *Failure of Elephants* — The reverse rout of the elephants trampling through their own ranks, totally ruined afghan rear ranks cohesion and was a major reason why they never participated in the battle. But the elephant was a weapon of a bygone age.

8. *Ibrahim's Death* — Lodis' charge was premature and unnecessary, while things were desperate upfront, he still had his centre division—shaken and albeit disorganized, but intact. He would have better served to rally his reserve and assault the flanking mughal columns. If he had lived another hour, the mughals may have lost the battle as Babur had minimal reserves left and the mughals too had suffered heavy casualties.

9. *Security* — To Napoleon is credited the saying — '*The whole art of war consists of a well-thought out and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by a rapid and audacious counterattack*'. Babur's tactics at Panipat were a perfect balance between caution and aggression. He secured his flanks with natural or artificial obstacles and his centre with this cart-line offsetting the afghan advantage in numbers.